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Abstract
This thesis first examines the inflows and outflows of four South Asian immigrant
groups (Philippines, Chinese, Thai and Vietnamese). The data include all immigrant
arrivals between 1967 and 2003. The results show that the majority male Chinese
immigrants left Norway after 5 years living in Norway while most Vietnamese immi-
grants still live in Norway. The out-migration patterns vary by country of origin and
class of admissions; immigrants from China based on work permit have the high-
est out-migration rates and immigrants from Vietnam reunified with refugees and
family reunification has the lowest propensities to out-migrate. The thesis further
studies the economic assimilation of these immigrant groups, with focus on earnings
and employment by gender. The empirical analysis contrasts results from cross-
sectional and longitudinal estimation models, because the cross-sectional estimator
is known to be fragile to bias caused by selective out-migration or cohort effects. It
is found that the immigrants from these four countries economic assimilate well dur-
ing the first 15 years in the Norwegian labour market. The earnings growth for the
Chinese males is overestimated in the cross-sectional model, and the analysis shows
that the bias is caused by selective out-migraiton. The analysis also shows that the
earnings growth for native females is understated in the cross-sectional model, and
results point to the bias stemming from younger birth cohorts having higher labour
market attachment. For native females, there are significant negative effects of hav-
ing children on earnings. The earnings of female immigrants are less affected by
having children. Over the life cycle female immigrants catch up with native women
in terms of economic status and are fully integrated in the Norwegian labour market.
Key words: South Asian country immigrants, Philippines, Chinese, Thai, Viet-
namese, Norway, class of admission, cross-sectional model, fixed effects model, labour
market, out-migration, economic assimilation and children.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Immigration is understandably a subject of public debate and economic analysis.
And the term of "economical assimilation" and "immigrant assimilation" have been
used for many years. Clark (2003) defines immigrant assimilation1 "as a way of
understanding the social dynamics of American society and the process that occurs
spontaneously and often unintended in the course of interaction between majority
and minority groups." However different to the "immigrant assimilation", a complex
process in which immigrants fully integrate themselves into a new country, Borjas
(1999) defines the concept of "economic assimilation" as the rate of wage convergence
between immigrants and natives in the host country. The wage convergence presents
the immigrant economical performance in the labour market determined by arrival
cohort, country of origin and immigrant status identified in the empirical economical
immigration literature.
The 2008 Population Census of Statistics Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyrå) re-
veals that the population of Norway is becoming increasingly diverse. It reports
that as of January 2008, 9.7 percent of Norway’s total population was immigrants.2
Statistics Norway also reports that Asia including Turkey is now the largest group
of immigrants in Norway, reaching a total of 173,880 on January, 2008 (shown in
figure 1.1).
When we look more closely at the Asian group, the four countries from Southeast
Asia: Philippines, China, Thailand and Vietnam, share the same geographic far
distance from Norway and have the same distance costs to Norway. The histories
1Most social scientists rely on four primary benchmarks to assess immigrant assimilation: so-
cioeconomic status, geographic distribution, second language attainment, and intermarriage.
2Immigrants and those born in Norway to immigrant parents constitute nearly 460,000 persons
or 9.7 percent of Norway’s population.
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Figure 1.1: Immigrant Population in Norway, 1970-2008. Source: Statistics Nor-
way, 1. January, 2008
of these four nations are both common and unique. Events in one nation always
spilled across borders, affecting people throughout the region, as was the case with
the Vietnam War, and Cultural Revolution in China. In addition, all four countries
have been influenced by outside nations such as France and Japan. At the same time,
each country consists of different people and cultures. For example, while Chinese
and Thai are predominantly Buddhist, Vietnamese traditionally hold a mixture of
Confucian and Taoist beliefs, and Philippines include Catholics, Muslims, Buddhists,
Protestants, and Animists. Moreover, each country has large ethnic minorities living
within its borders. For this reason, a study of immigrants from the four countries
offers important insights into the economic assimilation process.
This thesis first examines the inflows and outflows of these four South Asian
immigrants subgroups (Philippines, Chinese, Thai and Vietnamese) based on the
longitudinal migration data supplied by Statistic Norway. The data includes all
immigrant arrivals between 1967 and 2003. The results show that the out-migration
patterns vary by country of origin, class of admissions, age at arrivals and gen-
der. Secondly, using the longitudinal data set from 1980 to 2005, this thesis further
analyzes the process of the economic assimilation of the four subgroups in the Nor-
wegian labour market. This study examines various economic outcomes of these
3four groups by using cross-sectional, fixed effects and synthetic panel methodolo-
gies. What is the wage gaps between immigrants and natives? What kinds of jobs
can these male immigrants get in Norway? How fast do the immigrants assimilate
economically after they arrived in the host country? Are there any advantages for
female immigrants from these four countries entering mixed marriages as compared
to those marrying other immigrants? What is the effects of having children in-
fluence the earnings profile of females? How does the causal connection between
out-migration flows and economic assimilation results in light of return migration
decision theories3?
This thesis will shed light on the interplay between immigration policy and emi-
gration behavior. The thesis tries to explores whether the migration motives deter-
mine economic success in western countries.
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 presents relevant background the-
ory, and Chapter 3 describes the data sets and the theoretical paradigm. In Chapter
4 and Chapter 5, the descriptive data analysis of inflow and outflow patterns and
the most important results from economic assimilation models by genders are de-
scribed. Chapter 6 discusses some interesting questions that reflect the migration
flow patterns and the economic assimilation. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and
points out the need for future work. This thesis uses Stata 10.0 to analyze all the
data. And the most regression results are presented in the Appendix B.
3see Borjas and Bratsberg (1996)

Chapter 2
Theoretical Background
Refugee immigrants In recent years, Norwegian policymakers and the public
have grown increasingly concerned about the impact of immigration, especially
immigration from the less developed countries, on both the national and local
economies. In particular, there has been heated debates over whether or not refugee
immigrants, and labour immigrants from non-European countries are a drain on the
budgets and local governments because of the public services they utilize. Accurately
assessing the costs and contributions of immigrants, particularly refugee immigrants
and family reunification immigrants, is a challenge. Cortes (2004) analyzes the dif-
ferences between refugees and economic immigrants in U.S. and finds that refugee
immigrants on average have lower annual earnings upon arrival, however, their an-
nual earnings grow faster over time than those of economic immigrants. Cortes also
reports that refugees over time tend to have higher country-specific human capital
investment than economic immigrants. By contrast, Husted et al. (2000) find that
the employment probability of refugees in Denmark seems to approach the level of
non-refugee immigrants and Danish born individuals by estimating the wage and
employment separately for refugee and non-refugee immigrants. Moreover, they
suggest there are large differences in the initial probability of employment within
the group of refugee immigrants. This thesis will compare Vietnamese male refugee
immigrants and Chinese male work immigrants to see how these two different im-
migrant admission status affect the economic assimilation results.
South Asian immigrants There has not been done much research on immigrants
from far distance South Asian countries to immigrate into Europe. A research paper
of Guo and DeVoretz (2007) reveals that recent Chinese immigrants to Canada con-
5
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stitute a substantially different group from those of former years from rural areas of
Guangdong Province and Mainland China. Generally the migration from these four
South Asian countries have seldom been separately analyzed before, especially in
Norway. Furthermore, previous studies on economic assimilation are mainly focused
on the largest immigrant groups from nonwestern countries and OECD countries in
the host countries (See Chiswick (1978); Borjas (1999); Bauer et al. (2000)). In
Bratsberg et al. (2007b)1, the four largest nonwestern countries Pakistan, Turkey,
India, and Morocco immigrants in Norway were analyzed. Longva and Raaum
(2000) also estimate assimilation effects separately for immigrants from OECD and
non-OECD countries.
Migration and return migration There are quite a few empirical researches
about whether the migration decisions are related to difference in the wage levels
in the source country and the destination countries, as well as the migration cost
(see Sjaastad (1962), Borjas (1987), Borjas (1989)). The higher wages they get
in the host country and the lower migration cost of moving, compared to that of
the source country, the more likely they immigrate. Moreover, some literatures
(Bratsberg (1995): Michael and McDowell (1991); Ximena et al. (2004)) provide
evidence that the immigrant flows are connected to migration cost and the wage level
differences between source country and host country. The wage level of country and
migration cost are expressed by GDP per capita of that country and the distance
from the source country to the host country respectively. In this thesis, since these
four country immigrants have the same distance cost from their source country to
Norway, only the GDP per capita of each source country is used to analyze the
migration flows.
Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) show that there are two approaches to modeling the
return migration decision. The first hypothesis is that the return migration is related
with immigrants’ investment plans– "motivation", that some immigrants would like
to spend a few years to work or live in the host countries and then return to their
home countries after accumulating sufficiently large level of capital or wealth. The
second hypothesis is the "mistake" in the initial migration decision. After making
hard efforts in the host country for a few yeas, some immigrants realize that it is
too difficult to make their goals, they would either return to their home country or
1They find immigrant employment started a sharp and steady decline after ten years arrival,
compare to their employment rate when they just arrived. They also find that the immigrant
employment is particularly sensitive to the business cycle.
7go to another country to find new opportunities. Based on this theory, the more
successful the immigrants are in the host country, they more likely they are to stay.
Meanwhile, if the economic conditions in their home country improved, they prefer
to leave.
The assumption of constant flows of immigrant and native profiles may also be
problematic. Recent immigrant studies have also found that there are lots of immi-
grants that return to their home country or migrate to a third country from their
host country, see Van et al. (2006) and Borjas and Bratsberg (1996) for United
States; Amalie and Massey (2003) for Germany, Jensen and Pedersen (2005) for
Denmark. Bratsberg et al. (2007a), characterize the out-migration patterns in Nor-
way between 1967 and 2003 for male and female immigrants. Bratsberg found that
the out-migration rates are much lower for immigrants from nonwestern source coun-
tries. After more than 10 years of arrival, only 15 percent of the immigrants who
came on the ground of family reunification have left the country, and immigrants
admitted with work visas have about 50 percent propensities to out-migrate.
Female immigrants More recent evidence show that the migration decisions of
women are motivated by different factors than those of men (Marcela and Massey
(2001)). Bratsberg et al. (2007a) found evidence that males are the primary mi-
grants and that females are more likely to be granted family reunification. Further
Bratsberg et al. (2007a) report that this pattern is strongest for immigrants from
less developed nations.
Unfortunately, there is not much empirical research about marriage of female
immigrants. In a report from Statistics Norway Daugstad (2004) presents that
an increasing number of marriages in Norway are contracted between one person
without immigrant background and an immigrant every year. Daugstad also reports
that Thai and Philippine women are the largest groups of non-western immigrants
who married in Norway during 1996 to 2004. Thai women, furthermore, have in the
same period been the largest non-resident group of women who have entered into
marriages with Norwegian men. This thesis uses the information of longitudinal data
between 1980 to 2005 to compare the difference in economic assimilation for these
married female immigrants between endogamic marriages and exogamic marriages2
2Endogamy and exogamy: the two words describe groups of kin tendency to marry within
(endogamy) or out of (exogamy) their own group of kin (Hylland Eriksen (1993, p.100)). In this
thesis, the two words will describe immigrant groups’ tendencies to marry persons with the same
country background as themselves (endogamic), and groups’ tendencies to marry persons with a
different country background to themselves (exogamic).
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female immigrants.
Economic assimilation A large number of papers about adjusting the earnings
and employment rate assimilation of immigrants have been generated after Chiswick
(1978). Based on the 1970 Census of Population data, Chiswick estimates cross-
secional earnings regressions to find out that even immigrants initially earn 17%
less than the native-born workers but their earnings rise more rapidly than that of
natives. Furthermore, the immigrant earnings surpass the native earnings within 15
years in the U.S. labour market. The overtaking phenomenon was then explained
in terms of a selection argument: immigrants are "more able and more highly moti-
vated" than natives (Chiswick (1978, p.900)), or immigrants "choose to work longer
and harder than nonmigrants" (Caliner (1980, p.89) ).
However, Borjas (1985) argues that the results of Chiswick are overestimated
since he does not taking into account the selective out-migration and cohort effects.
And it’s problematic to assume the immigrant cohorts are constant over time. Bor-
jas points out the selective out-migration and the cohort effects over different periods
will seriously bias the cross-sectional estimates. For instance, if the immigrants who
do not do well in the United States are more likely to emigrate, the coefficient of
years since migration (Y SM) will be biased upward, since earlier cohorts of immi-
grants will have been self-selected to include only the most successful immigrants.
And if the institutional changes in immigration policies or political disturbance in
sending countries lead to higher labour attachment3 immigration, the cross-sectional
estimated coefficient of years since migration will be downwardly biased. Then Bor-
jas used the 1970 and 1980 Public Use Samples from the U.S. census to show that
the unobserved earnings potential differs among immigrant cohorts by decomposing
the cross-sectional growth into within-cohort growth and across-cohort growth.
Unluckily, despite the potential importance of selective out-migration of the im-
migrants, due to the lack of emigration data previous studies do not take into account
the effects of the selective out-migration on the measured economic assimilation pro-
cess. Lubotsky (2007) used longitudinal earnings data and repeated cross-sectional
data to show emigration by low-wage immigrants indeed systematically led past re-
searchers to overestimate the wage progress of immigrants who remain in the United
States.
Recent researches focus on using the synthetic panel methodology (Borjas, 1987,
3It is the same as the unobserved earnings potential or the individual fixed component in the
fixed effects model.
91994, 1995) to compare with cross-sectional "Classical Model" Chiswick (1978) to
investigate the earnings or employment difference between natives and immigrants.
(see Barth et al. (2004) Bratsberg et al. (2007b) and Bratsberg (2000) for Norway,
Husted et al. (2000) for Denmark and etc.)
This thesis starts with a descriptive statistical analysis of inflows and outflows for
immigrants from these four South Asian countries. I want to find the patterns of out-
migration and how out-migration is related with the admission class. I then use the
longitudinal micro data to analyze the economical assimilation of immigrants such
as the earnings growth and employment rate. By comparing the earnings growth of
immigrants and natives measured in cross-sectional model and fixed effects model,
this thesis studies how the effects of selective out-migration and the cohort effects
led the earnings growth estimated in cross-sectional model was biased previously.
Female immigrant marriage status and child bearing effects are also considered to
further investigate the economic assimilation patterns of female immigrants.

Chapter 3
Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
3.1.1 Immigrant flow data
The flow movement part of this thesis draws on individual records from 1967 to 2003
supplied by Statistic Norway on migration for these four countries that crossed the
border of Norwegian municipality. This study combines the migration records with
individual demographic characteristics, such as data on birth, gender and country
of birth from the Norwegian population registration data. Foreign-borns with Nor-
wegian parents and Norwegian-borns with immigrant parents are excluded from the
samples.
This data includes almost all immigrant arrivals in Norway because the immi-
grants who enter Norway are strictly required to sign the detailed form by rules.
However, these data might not be complete and accurate to record certain moves
out of the country due to the fact that signing the out-migration form should take
place after the actual date of moving. There are still error-in-variable bias for those
people who left Norway and changed their previous plans. Therefore this study
might have biases to estimate the out-migration and overstate the duration of im-
migrant stays in Norway. Though it is quite difficult to measure the magnitude of
such bias, less than 7.7% of the out-migration records lack individual information
of those who moved out of the country. In addition, the data information of class of
admission is only available from 1988 to the summer 1994. Therefore, the analysis
of out-migration patterns by admission class is based on smaller subsets, compared
to the data set from 1967-2003. Table 3.1 lists key variables in the data set from
11
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1988-1994.
Table 3.1: Sample Means of Out-migration Flows 1988-1994
Males: Philippines China Thailand Vietnam
Age at immigration 27.30 31.95 20.02 27.70
Out-migration rate 0.33 0.49 0.34 0.05
Admission Class
Primary refugee 0.0471 0.0447 0.1250 0.5444
Refugee family reunification 0.0135 0.0037 0.0139 0.4481
Work permit 0.0438 0.4932 0.0486 0.0032
Student visa 0.1246 0.2522 0.1042 0.0016
Family reunification 0.6263 0.1280 0.6111 0.0005
Other 0.1448 0.0783 0.0972 0.0021
Year of Immigration
1988 0.2694 0.1528 0.1181 0.1603
1989 0.2323 0.2720 0.1736 0.2561
1990 0.2155 0.2000 0.1667 0.1672
1991 0.1044 0.1379 0.1528 0.1598
1992 0.0808 0.1230 0.1528 0.1656
1993 0.0808 0.0845 0.1806 0.0688
1994 0.0168 0.0298 0.0556 0.0222
Observations 297 805 144 1,890
Females:
Age at immigration 28.43 30.98 27.69 29.43
Out-migration rate 0.34 0.35 0.16 0.06
Admission Class
Primary refugee 0.0094 0.0214 0.0203 0.2635
Refugee family reunification 0.0040 0.0295 0.0118 0.7270
Work permit 0.0330 0.0469 0.0075 0.0014
Student visa 0.3136 0.2142 0.0214 0.0005
Family reunification 0.5435 0.5837 0.8034 0.0059
Other 0.0964 0.1044 0.1357 0.0018
Year of Immigration
1988 0.2023 0.0977 0.1528 0.1901
1989 0.1962 0.1995 0.1848 0.2191
1990 0.1693 0.1566 0.1816 0.1593
1991 0.1349 0.1981 0.1026 0.1417
1992 0.1261 0.1834 0.1838 0.1403
1993 0.1288 0.1165 0.1453 0.0982
1994 0.0425 0.0482 0.0491 0.0512
Observations 1,483 747 936 2,209
3.1.2 Economic assimilation data
The economic assimilation part of this thesis is based on two large longitudinal data
sets, originating from Statistics Norway. The first native Norwegian data set (about
270,000 in 2005) is a 5 percent sample of the Norwegian population (about 3,500,000
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individuals) covering the period 1980-2005. The immigrant data set is individually
yearly derived from the longitudinal data sets containing information on the entire
population in Norway for the years 1980-2005. These two data samples contain large
information on demographic and labour market characteristics for the individuals
and their families, such as: age, year of residence, annual earnings, employment
rate, education, marriage status, and etc. Both samples include men and women
who were born between 1920 and 1985 and person-year observations with positive
earnings, in which the individual was between age 25 and age 56 and employed.
The income is measured in NOK and is inflated by the consumer price index (2005
prices). The information on wages is based on the taxable annual earnings. Table
3.2 gives the summary statistics in these two data sets, separately for immigrants
and natives.
Table 3.2: Sample Means, Immigrants and Natives, 1980-2005
Males: Philippines Chinese Thai Vietnamese Native
Years since arrival 10.48 7.32 6.83 10.76 0.00
Age 39.66 37.56 34.17 37.24 38.73
Educ 7.33 6.71 6.61 9.35 12.56
Educ Missing 0.39 0.43 0.40 0.11 0.00
Children 2.00 1.30 0.77 2.61 1.88
City 0.72 0.75 0.65 0.73 0.45
Countryside 0.28 0.25 0.35 0.27 0.55
Employment Rate 0.85 0.70 0.59 0.67 0.91
Log(Annual Earnings) 12.42 11.89 11.81 12.00 12.67
Observations 12,035 16,409 1,778 50,669 1,043,831
Females:
Years Since Arrival 8.32 6.63 6.46 9.16 0.00
Age 36.48 36.34 35.77 36.77 38.85
Educ 6.59 7.86 5.33 7.78 12.38
Educ Missing 0.43 0.34 0.37 0.17 0.00
Children 1.57 1.35 1.36 2.70 2.05
City 0.53 0.71 0.48 0.70 0.46
Countryside 0.47 0.29 0.52 0.30 0.54
Employment Rate 0.62 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.79
Log(Annual Earnings) 11.84 11.57 11.50 11.62 12.05
Observations 54,873 17,057 36,874 45,448 999,470
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3.2 Out-migration probability model
The binary-choice model of the probability to out-migrate is given by the probit
model1
yi = Φ(αDi + βCi + γYi + δFi + ηAi), (3.1)
The probit model of the decision to out-migrate depends on the class of admis-
sion, country of origin, entry year and the ‘Age at immigration’. Where yi is the
probability of out-migration for individual i; Di is the class of admission dummies2;
Ci is the source country dummies3; Yi is the entry year dummies4 in which the im-
migrant arrived in Norway; Fi is the female immigrants dummy variable5 and Ai is
the ‘age at immigration’ dummies 6 of the individual.
In the empirical analysis, the probability of out-migration is first estimated by
using one single variable ‘Age at immigration’ and then separately estimated by
different ‘Age at immigration’ groups: 21 to 30, 31 to 40, 41 to 50, 51 to 60 and
more than 60 years old.
Econometric specifications
Suppose y∗i is the latent variable of making the decision to out-migrate, the model
in eq. 3.1 can be expressed as:
y∗i = xiβi + ui. (3.2)
Even if we cannot observe the latent variable y∗i , the decision rule of one immi-
1dprobit fits maximum likelihood probit models and is an alternative to probit. Rather than
reporting the maximum likelihood estimates of coefficients (see "Econometric specifications"), dpro-
bit reports the marginal effects dF/dx, which is the effects for an average individual. Thus the
dprobit can display the marginal effect of an infinitesimal change in xi.
2omitted the class of admission with primary refugee
3omitted Vietnam
4except the indicator 1988 year
5omitted gender males
6‘Age at immigration’ means the difference between the observed year of immigrants who enter
into the host country and the immigrant birth year. Age at immigration=observed immigrate
year-birth year of immigrant. Here the Age at immigration=13 years old is omitted; the quadrics
of ages is not considered for not increase the significance of the gender analysis.
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grant’s out-migration is observable:
yi =
 0 if y
∗
i < 0 Immigrant dose not choose to out−migrate,
1 if y∗i ≥ 0 Immigrant chooses to out−migrate,
then the probability of an immigrant y1 choosing to out-migrate given x1 is:
Pr(y1 = 1|x1) = Φ(x1β1) and Pr(y1 = 0|x1) = 1− Φ(x1β1);
so the probability of observing y1 conditional on x1 can be written as
Pr(y1 = y1|x1) = {Φ(x1β1)}y1{1− Φ(x1β1)}1−y1 , y1 = 0, 1
where Φ(.) is the cumulative normal distribution function. Therefore a change
in factor x1 does not have a direct linear effect on the Pr(y1 = 1|x1). The marginal
effects of change of x1 on y1 can be expressed as:
∂Pr(y1 = 1|x1)
∂x1
= ∂Pr(y1 = 1|x1)
∂x1β1
· ∂x1β1
∂x1
= Φ′(x1β1) · β1 = Ψ(x1β1) · β1 (3.3)
The effect of an increase in x1 on the probability is the product of two factors: the
effect of x1 on the latent variable Φ(.) and the derivative of the Φ(.) evaluated at y∗1.
The probit likelihood function is the joint density of y1, ..., yn given x1, ...xn,
treated as a function of β1:
f(β1; y1, ....yn|x1, ...xn) =
{Φ(x1β1)}y1{1− Φ(x1β1)}1−y1 × ...× {Φ(xnβn)}yn{1− Φ(xnβn)}1−yn (3.4)
The parameters of binary-choice models are estimated by using the maximum
likelihood techniques. The log likelihood of eq.3.4 for observation i can be written
as
L(β) = ln[f(β1; y1, ..., yn)] =
N∑
i=1
li(βi) = (
n∑
i=1
yi) ln Φ(xiβi)+(n−
n∑
i=1
yi) ln(1−Φ(xiβi))
Maximize the likelihood by setting the derivative = 0:
∂ ln f(β1; y1, ...yn)
∂Φ(xiβi)
= (
n∑
i=1
yi)
1
Φ(xiβi)
+ (n−
n∑
i=1
yi)(
−1
1− Φ(xiβi)) = 0
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Solving for βi yields the maximum likelihood estimator(MLE).
3.3 The economic assimilation models
3.3.1 Cross-sectional model
The ‘classical model’ for analyzing wage assimilation between immigrants and native
individuals is given by Chiswick (1978). Based on Borjas’ methodology (see Borjas,
1987, 1994, 1995), it is possible to estimate the assimilation effects on earnings and
employment rate by pooling data from several cross-section. Thus I pooled the
sample of native and foreign-born men or women for each year from 1970 to 2005.
Using the notation of Husted et al. (2000), ignoring the higher-order polynomials,
the ‘classical model’ can be expressed as:
The earnings profile model for immigrants is:
lnWij = Xijφij + αY SMij + δiAij + εij, (3.5)
The earnings profile model for natives is:
lnWnj = Xnjφnj + δnAnj + εnj, (3.6)
where lnWij is the log annual wage of person i in cross-section j; X is a vector of
socioeconomic characteristics (such as education7); Aij denote the age of individual
i at the time when cross-section j is observed (j = 1, ...., 26); Y SM is the number of
years spent in the country of destination (years since migration); and εij represents
unobservable influences on earnings and measurement error. It is remarked that the
coefficient of Y SMij in eq.3.5 measures the differential value a year (t) spent in the
destination country versus a year spent in the original country, such as:
α∗ = ∂logWi
∂t
|Immigrant − ∂logWi
∂t
|Native = α + δi − δn; (3.7)
where α∗ measures the rate of wage convergence between immigrants and natives.
Thus if:
α∗ = α + δi − δn > 0 =⇒ α + δi > δn; (3.8)
7There are some education information is missing, thus I generate a dummy variable ‘edmiss’
to account for the education missing.
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This means the economic assimilation occurs on the immigrants’ earnings profile.
Some empirical literature used only the coefficient of Y SM (α > 0) to define that
the assimilation happens. But the use of quartic polynomials of A and Y SM makes
it much complex to interpret the coefficients. The immigrant assimilation analyses
will based on eq.3.8 to implicitly explain the assimilation.
3.3.2 Fixed effects model
Different to cross-sectional model without time dimension8 (t), fixed effects model
uses the longitudinal data for N different individuals observed at T different time
periods. The economic assimilation data studied in this thesis contains observation
forN = 2, 278, 444 individuals, where each individuals is observed in T = 26 different
time periods (each of the years 1980, ...., 2005). Fixed effects model not only controls
the effects of out-migration by tracking of each individual in all the periods, but also
control the omitted variables in panel data when the omitted variables9 vary across
individuals but do not change over time. The fixed effects regression model has
N different intercepts, one for each individual.10 Assume that Zin is an omitted
variable that varies from one person to the next but does not changing over time
(for example, Zin represents the unobserved earnings potential of immigrant ‘i′ or
native ‘n′) The "true" regression equation for immigrants ‘i′ and natives ‘n′ in "fixed"
effect form is:
lnWint = a+ bf(Y SMit) + cf(Aint) + γZin + εint (3.9)
Note that there is no need to include time-invariant demographics into the re-
gressor list as their effect on lnWint is absorbed by variable Zin.
Because Zin varies from one state to the next but is constant over time, the "true"
regression model can be interpreted as having N intercepts, one for each individual.
8Note that the notation j in eq.3.5 and eq.3.6 represents the jth cross-section in 26 cross-
sectional surveys, which is different to time t.
9The immigrants’ unobserved earnings potential may be an omitted variable that produce an
omitted variable bias (OVB) since, more able people tend to be more productive and, hence, enjoy
higher earnings, which implies that the unobserved earnings potential is a determinant of real
earnings.
10These intercepts can be represented by a set of binary variables. These binary variables absorb
the influences of all omitted variables that differ from one individual to the next but are constant
over time.
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Specially, let αin = a+ γZin. Then eq.3.9 becomes:
lnWint = αin + bf(Y SMit) + cf(Aint) + εint, i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ....T ; (3.10)
Eq.3.10 is the fixed effects regression model, in which α1....αN are treated as
unknown intercepts to be estimated, one for each individual11. The slope coefficients
for f(Y SMit) and f(Aint), b and c are the same for all individuals, but the intercept
of the regression varies from one unit to the next.
This regression eq.3.10 can be estimated in Stata software. Stata typically com-
pute the OLS fixed effects estimator in two steps. First, the entity specific average is
subtracted from each variable. In the second step, the regression is estimated using
"entity-demand" variables.
First assume X1it = f(Y SMit), X2int = f(Aint), Yint = lnWint, and the average
panel of X1it, X2int and εint are:
X¯1it = (1/T )
T∑
i=1
X1it, X¯2int = (1/T )
T∑
i=1
X2int, Y¯int = (1/T )
T∑
i=1
Yint,
and ε¯int = (1/T )
T∑
i=1
εint
Then remove the panel-level average from each side of eq.3.10 and the constant
variable for each individual Zin and ain are also the panel-level averages for them-
selves:
Yint − Y¯int = αin − αin + b(X1it − X¯1it) + c(X2int − X¯2int) + γ(zin − zin) + εint − ε¯int
This gives the "entity-demeaned" fixed effects model:
Y˜int = bX˜1it + cX˜2int + ε˜int (3.11)
Eq.3.11 has four advantages by transformation. Firstly the entity fixed effects
term αin is extracted from eq.3.10. Therefore the outcome clearly implies that any
characteristic that does not vary over time for each unit cannot be included in
the model (Such as education, culture attitudes toward the labour market or some
other labour market attachment). Secondly this model permits each individual
11It is remarked that the αin are assumed to be correlated with the regresses in f(Y SMit),
f(Aint) and zin, they are known as entity fixed effect.
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to have its own constant term while the slope estimates b and c are constrained
across units.12 The estimators b and c are also called bFE and cFE since the large-
sample estimator of the VCE of bFE is just the standard OLS estimator of the VCE
that has been adjusted for the degrees of freedom used up by the within transform
s2(∑Ni=1∑Tt=1 x˜itx′it)−1 where s2 = 1/(NT −N − k − 1)∑Ni=1∑Tt=1 ˆ˜ε2it and ˆ˜εit are the
residuals from the ordinal least squares (OLS) regression of y˜it on x˜it. Further, the
unit-specific intercept term absorbs all the heterogeneity in y and x that is a function
of the identity of the unit, and any variable constant over time for each unit will
be perfectly collinear with the unit’s indicator variable. Finally this model will not
be affected if some individuals have, e.g., very high y values and very high x values
because this model will have explanatory power only if the individual’s y above or
below the individual’s mean is significantly correlated with the individual’s x values
above or below the individual’s vector of mean x value. Therefore it is only the
within variation that will show up as explanatory power.
The fixed effects assumptions are: The identifying assumption is that the time
subsripts in eq.3.10: εint has mean zero, given the individual fixed effect and entire
history of f(Y SMint) and f(Aint) for that unit, that is
E(εint|f(Y SMit), f(Aint), αin) = 0
This assumption implies there is no omitted variable bias.
The other important assumption different to cross-sectional data is that:
corr(εint, εins|f(Y SMit), f(Aint), αin) = 0 for t 6= s
This says that given f(Y SMit) and f(Aint), the error terms are uncorrelated over
time within each individual. If this assumption fails, the OLS panel data esti-
mator of b and c are still unbiased, consistent, but the OLS standard errors will be
wrong. This problem can be solved by using "heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-
consistent (HAC) standard errors".
12This estimator is often termed the least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) model, since it is
equivalent to including N-1 dummy variables in the OLS regression of y on x (including a units
vector). However, the name LSDV is fraught with problems because it implies an infinite number
of parameters in our estimator.
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3.3.3 Sythetic panel model
The employment rate is the other important indicator of economic assimilation.
Using the notation of Borjas (1999) and ignoring higher-order polynomial terms,
the sythetic panel methodology can be represented by two earnings equations, one
for immigrants (eq.3.12) and one for natives (eq.3.13):
empij = Xijφij + αY SMij + δiAij + βCij +
26∑
j=1
γijpiij + εij, (3.12)
empnj = Xnjφnj + δnAnj +
26∑
j=1
γnjpinj + εnj, (3.13)
where the depend variable is substituted to the employment rate of person i
in cross-section j (j = 1, ..., 26), empij; the calendar year in which the immigrant
arrived in the host country is given by Cij; piij and pinj are indicator variables
reflecting the year of observation13.
However the parameters of immigrants eq.3.12 are not identifiable, because of
the perfect collinearity among the variables Y SM , C and pi, shown in eq.3.14. To
solve this problem, Borjas (1985) assumes the restricting period effects to be the
same for immigrants and native workers, that is γij = γnj for all j.
empij ≡
26∑
j=1
pij(Tj − Cij) (3.14)
where a total of 26 cross-sectional survey are available from 1980-2005, with cross-
section j (j = 1, ...., 26) being obtained in calendar year Tj.
The interaction of the immigrants (imm) and the education variables (immeduc)
are also included in both regression of cross-sectional model and synthetic panel
model.
13piij and pinj is also called the period effects which reflects the earnings of natives and immigrants
is influenced by the business cycle fluctuations or the economic growth rate.
Chapter 4
Immigrant Flows
This section begins with descriptive statistic analysis of the inflows, outflows and
class of admission for these four country immigrants on the basis of unbalanced
longitudinal data.1 Then this section further studies the selective out-migration be-
havior by linking out-migration with admission class. The out-migration probability
is separately estimated for men and women with factors of admission class, source
country, years of immigration and age at immigration. Finally, the GDP per capita
of the immigrant source country and the economic conditions of the destination
country are analyzed to understand the immigrant migration decisions.
4.1 Inflow and outflow patterns, 1967-2003
Figure 4.1 illustrates the immigrant flows separately for immigrants from Philip-
pines, China, Thailand and Vietnam over a 36-year period between 1967 and 2003.
Immigrants are defined as foreign-born persons of foreign-born parents. The solid
line measures annual immigrant arrivals, and the dotted line denotes the original
immigrant cohorts remaining in Norway on January, 2004. As the figure demon-
strates, the immigration flows to Norway have fluctuated over time, but have grown
over the whole time period. The total population of these four country immigrants
in Norway has been increasing from 6,671 in 1967 to 24,273 in 2003.
Panel A, B, C and D of figure 4.1 respectively display the immigrant trends
for each of these four countries. The sharp increase in the Vietnamese migration
1There are twice as many female immigrants as male immigrants in this longitudinal data. The
longitudinal data has some missing data for at least one time period for at least one individual.
The information of class of admission is based on a subset of the sample period (1988-1994).
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Figure 4.1: South Asian Immigrant Flows to Norway, 1967-2003
flows demonstrates the importance of asylum and refugee admissions in Norwegian
immigration policy. Panel D shows the two peaks for Vietnamese immigrants: they
started moving to Norway in a large scale in the early 1980s and the migration
peaked in 1989. The fluctuated migration patterns is consistent with the Vietnam
War which affected Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia from 1959 to April 30, 1975. The
peaks in panel A for the Filipinos during the late 1980s and early 2000 are related
to au-pair program for the Filipino female workers.2 The Chinese (panel B) mainly
arrived in Norway during the period 1985-90 when China began to make major
reforms in its economy. The Chinese government also had focused on foreign trade
as a major vehicle for economic growth. The migration flow of Thais (panel C),
rose slowly during the mid 1980s, and has increased dramatically in recent years.
A reasonable explanation to the peak in Thai migration flow is that it relates to
the increasing number of trans-national marriages between Thai females and native
2Stenum (2008) reports that the percentage of the Filipino au pairs among the total number of
au pairs has increased dramatically in Denmark and Norway in the recent years. Such as in 2007,
there are 2,207 au pairs are working in Denmark and 1,510 are Filipinos. The figures for Norway
are 1,760 and 1,103 respectively.
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males in the recent years (see Daugstad (2004)).
The out-migration behavior is illustrated by the difference between the solid and
dotted lines in figure 4.1. In other words the residual between the solid and dotted
lines consists of out-migrants, plus those who died while in Norway, minus those
among the out-migrants who later re-immigrated and stayed in Norway until 2004.
Thus panel A and panel B roughly implies more Filipino immigrants and Chinese
immigrants move out by the convergence of the two lines over time. Additionally, fig-
ure 14.1 presents that a large minority of early immigrant cohorts from Philippines,
Thailand and Vietnam who remained in Norway in 2004.
Table 4.1 provides further detailed information of migration patterns for male
and female immigrants by these four countries. It is clear in column 1 that more
than 33,000 immigrants from these four South Asian countries arrived in Norway
during 1967-2003, and 82.4 percent of them were residents by the end of 2003. A
minor fraction died (while in Norway) during the sample period, and 16.1 percent
emigrate abroad. Because some of the immigrants who left Norway later reentered,
the percentage with at least one out-migration (18.5)3 is slightly higher than the
fraction who emigrate abroad (16.1). For the immigrants from these four countries,
nearly ninety percent of the Vietnamese (column 5) were residents in 2004, while
only less than eight percent of the Vietnamese left Norway. Among those Vietnamese
who left, more than sixty percent of them moved onward to a third country and only
twenty percent of them moved back to their home country. Around eighty percent
early Filipino cohorts (column 2) were residents by the end of 2003. Meanwhile,
more than sixty percent of the Filipinos who emigrated from Norway moved back
to their home country. Thai (column 4) has the similar background of migration
patterns as Filipinos, roughly 87% stayed in Norway, only 12.3% left, and around
68.4% of those who emigrated returned to Thailand. This table also indicates that of
these four country immigrants, Chinese immigrants (column 3) are the most likely to
out-migrate.4 In addition, more than half of the Chinese left Norway (63.3 percent)
and moved back to their home country, only 10 percent of them re-immigrated to
Norway.
Figure 4.2 displays the immigration flows for these four country immigrants over
the same sample period as figure 4.1, but separately for males and females. We see
3"At least one out-migrate" is the sum of the number of people who out-migrate and the
number of people who out-migrate but return. At least one outmigrate = Npeople emigrate +
Npeople emigrate but return
4The percentage of Chinese immigrants who emigrate is 36 percent, which is the highest among
that of others.
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Table 4.1: South Asian Immigrants to Norway 1967-2003
Total Philippines China Thailand Vietnam
All immigrants 33,554 8,123 5,811 6,620 13,000
Residence status in 2004:
In Norway(%) 82.4 79.7 64.6 87.0 89.7
Dead(%) 1.5 1.0 1.4 0.7 2.3
Abroad(%) 16.1 19.3 34.0 12.3 8.0
At least one out-migration(%) 18.5 23.6 36.6 14.3 9.4
Among out-migrants:
Moved to home country(%) 55.9 63.9 63.3 68.4 20.9
Moved to third country(%) 28.3 18.5 18.6 20.5 66.6
Unknown destination(%) 15.8 17.5 18.1 11.1 12.5
Reimmigrated to Norway(%) 16.3 21.9 10.0 15.6 19.0
Male immigrants 12,298 1,808 2,904 1,093 6,493
Residence status in 2004:
In Norway(%) 78.8 76.2 57.5 76.7 89.3
Dead(%) 2.1 1.8 1.6 0.5 2.8
Abroad(%) 19.1 22.0 40.9 22.9 7.9
At least one out-migration(%) 21.4 26.8 43.8 24.5 9.3
Among out-migrants:
Moved to home country(%) 56.1 68.0 65.9 68.3 20.4
Moved to third country(%) 27.8 17.1 16.1 17.9 65.3
Unknown destination(%) 16.1 14.8 17.9 13.8 14.3
Reimmigrated to Norway(%) 14.1 22.3 9.8 9.0 18.6
Female immigrants 21,256 6,315 2,907 5,527 6,507
Residence status in 2004:
In Norway(%) 84.5 80.7 71.7 89.0 90.2
Dead(%) 1.1 0.7 1.2 0.7 1.8
Abroad(%) 14.4 18.5 27.1 10.3 8.1
At least one out-migration(%) 16.9 0.2 0.3 0.1 9.6
Among out-migrants:
Moved to home country(%) 55.7 62.5 59.4 68.4 21.3
Moved to third country(%) 28.8 19.0 22.3 21.6 67.9
Unknown destination(%) 15.5 18.4 18.3 10.0 10.8
Reimmigrated to Norway(%) 17.9 21.8 10.3 18.2 19.4
that the gender mix of immigrants is obviously not balanced, since nearly twice as
many females (21,256) as males (12,298) from these four countries arrived in Norway
during the 36-year period 1967-2003. As depicted in figure 4.2, the peaks and troughs
of male and female immigration flows follow remarkably similar patterns. Panel G
and panel H show that almost all the male and female Vietnamese immigrants
stay in Norway the whole time. This also shows that the Vietnamese males first
arrived in the 1980s, while Vietnamese females mostly arrived in the late 1990s. This
implies that the lately arrived Vietnamese females who came to Norway were granted
permission to stay as "refugee family reunification" which is related with their earlier
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admitted refugee husbands. Panel A, B, E and F suggest that female immigrants
primarily dominate the immigration flows for immigrants from the Philippines and
Thailand. However most of the Filipino females arrived in the late 1980s, and Thai
females only start migrating to Norway in the recent years. It seems like in Panel
C and panel D that the immigrant population is equal between Chinese males and
Chinese females. The balanced pattern of Chinese males and females might be due
to the relative small samples of Chinese population. Moreover, these two panels also
indicate that quite a lot of Chinese males and females migrate from Norway during
1967-2003.
4.2 Out-migration patterns
Figure 4.3 traces the fraction of immigrants remaining in Norway by the year since
migration, separately by genders. The slope of the curve denotes the out-migration
rate which is the probability that an individual leaves the host country during a
calendar year, given residency at the beginning of the year. Panel A depicts this
pattern for male immigrants, and panel B for females. In both panels I have selected
the year since migration between 0-12 years to avoid the population bias of small
samples, since quite few immigrants from these four countries arrived in Norway re-
cently. The convexities of the curves for immigrants from the Philippines, Thailand
and China in figure 4.3 implicate that the out-migration rate decrease dramatically
within their first 5 years of residence in Norway, by contrast to the almost straight
downwards line of the Vietnamese. Furthermore, more than 40 percent of the Chi-
nese males and more than 25 percent of the Chinese females left after staying 5
years, while more than 97 percent and 95 percent of the Vietnamese males and fe-
males respectively continue to stay after 5 years in Norway. This implies that the
out-migration probability of immigrants might be linked to the immigrants’ admis-
sion types or some other heterogeneity difference among these four source countries,
such as: the migration regulation in both source and host countries, immigration
motives, discrimination in the host country, culture conflicts, economic development
of the source country and immigrant plans. On the other hand, by comparing the
male panel A and female panel B, we see a much lower out-migration propensity
for females than that of males. Thus the out-migration decision of female immi-
grants may differ from that of males due to the fact that most female immigrants
are granted family reunification. Figure 4.3 therefore, implies that we should search
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Figure 4.2: South Asian Immigrants to Norway, by Gender 1967-2003. Note that
the scale on y axes are different for each country due to different sizes of samples.
for more information on the class of admission for these four country immigrants.
Table 4.2 lists the information on migration to Norway by country and class
of admission, based on the available data during 1988 to 1994. The Vietnamese
immigrants primarily came as refugees, asylum seekers, as well as for refugee family
reunification, compared to a fairly small percentage who came to work or study.
Both male and female Filipinos are more likely to be admitted on the basis of family
reunification. In addition some Filipino females are admitted with student visa. The
percentage of Thai females admitted with family reunification is surprisingly high,
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Figure 4.3: Fraction Remaining In Norway, by Gender and Country 1967-2002
over 80 percent, which is far more than the others. It relates with the fact around
97% of the Thai females are married with native Norwegians5. Chinese males mainly
came as labour immigrants, in addition to 22.6% student immigrants. The Chinese
females 60.4% are admitted for family reunification6 in addition to 19.3% student
immigrants.
Table 4.2 denotes further how out-migration behavior differs substantially by
admission class. The Vietnamese males and females who were granted permission
to stay as primary refugees and political asylum have the highest probability to stay
in Norway. They may have relatively week family ties to their home countries or
some other personal characteristics that make them less mobile than other groups.
5In the Chapter 5.
6Most of the Chinese female immigrants marry immigrants rather than natives. For example,
there are 11,738 Chinese women married Chinese men and 2,927 Chinese women married native
men during 1980-2005. (Shown in the Chapter 5.)
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Labour immigrants and student immigrants have the largest probability to out-
migrate, compared to individuals who are granted refugee political asylum. We saw
the previous figure 4.3 that more than 40 percent of Chinese males left Norway
within 5 years of arrival. In a similar way, the majority of the student immigrants
from the Philippines and China have also left Norway. A final point of table 4.2
is that male immigrants are more likely to be primary immigrants, compared to
female immigrants who are much more likely to be admitted on the basis of family
reunification. And the female immigrants admitted for family unification have lower
out-migration propensities than the other females. As a result, figure 4.3 and table
4.2 indicate a relationship between class of admission and out-migration behavior,
and this relationship differs by source country and gender.
Table 4.2: Class of Admission to Norway for South Asian Immigrants, 1988-1994.
A - Refugee / Political asylum; B - Refugee family reunification; C - Work permit;
D - Student visa; E - Family reunification; F - Other.
Class of admission
Immigrant
count
A (%) B (%) C (%) D (%) E (%) F(%)
Philippines
All 1,991 3.0 0.8 3.1 25.2 56.9 11.0
Males 398 7.0 1.8 3.3 9.3 63.1 15.6
Females 1,593 2.0 0.6 3.1 29.2 55.4 9.8
China
All 1,728 3.4 1.6 25.0 21.0 39.4 9.6
Males 8,98 4.5 0.6 44.2 22.6 19.9 8.2
Females 830 2.3 2.8 4.2 19.3 60.4 11.1
Thailand
All 1,255 5.4 1.1 1.1 2.9 76.9 12.6
Males 223 16.1 0.9 3.1 7.2 61.4 11.2
Females 1,032 3.1 1.2 0.7 1.9 80.2 12.9
Vietnam
All 5,024 39.4 59.9 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.2
Males 2,387 51.4 47.9 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.2
Females 2,637 28.5 70.7 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.2
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4.3 Estimation of out-migration probability
The regression results of estimation of out-migration probability by using eq.3.1
are presented in table 4.3. This model is separately estimated for males, females,
and all the immigrants. Because of using some omitted dummy variables, the con-
stant terms are retained but restricted. Such as the constant term of regression
in column 1 which is strictly restricted for Vietnamese male primary refugees who
immigrated in 1988 when they were 13 years old. It should also be noted that
the coefficients on the binary variables represent the incremental effect of being in
that category, relative to the base case of the omitted category, holding constant
the other regressors. For instance, in column 1, the coefficient on China (21.58%),
would be the average difference between out-migration probability of immigrants
from China and immigrants from Vietnam, holding constant the other variables in
the regression. Simultaneously, the coefficient on work permit (7.25%) would be the
average difference between out-migration probability in work permit and primary
refugee, holding constant the other variables in the regression. Both 21.58% and
7.25% are significant and positive, and 21.58% > 7.25%, which imply the fact that
Chinese are significantly more likely to out-migrate than Vietnamese (all the other
factors being equal) is dominated by the factor of source country–‘China’ rather
than admission class–‘work permit’. On the other hand, column 1 in table 4.3 also
verifies the previous statements, the student immigrants have a significantly larger
out-migration probability than primary refugees; female immigrants, on the other
hand, are significantly less likely to out-migrate than male immigrants, all the things
being equal.
When it comes to comparing the regression results by genders in column 2 and
column 3, it is found that male immigrants from Thailand and Philippines are
more likely to emigrate Norway than those from Vietnam and China, and female
immigrants from China are the most likely to leave among all the female immigrants.
An additional implication of this results is that all immigrants are more likely to
emigrate in the economic recession year of 1993 than any other years, all the other
things being equal. The male immigrants are more likely to emigrate than female
immigrants in the year of 1993, reflecting that the male immigrants are more likely
to lose their jobs in the recession year. When the economic situation of the host
country became worse, the out-migration probability of immigrants increased since
they could not easily find jobs. The economic condition of Norway by years can
be indicated by the unemployment rate of Norway during the whole period, which
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Table 4.3: Out-migration Probability, Probit Regressions
All Males Females
(1) (2)
Admission Class
(Omitted Primary refugee)
Refugee family -.0603*** -.0904*** -.0700***
Reunification (.0144) (.0201) (.0196)
Work permit .0725** .0423 .1486**
(.0347) (.0412) (.0717)
Student visa .4998*** .6143*** .5097***
(.0405) (.0565) (.0579)
Family reunification -.0055 -.0463 .0372
(.0252) (.0313) (.0397)
Other .1728*** .1356*** .2300***
(.0415) (.0602) (.0625)
Country
(Omitted Vietnam)
Philippines .1501*** .2930*** .0582
(.0339) (.0637) (.0420)
China .2158*** .2569*** .1088**
(.0359) (.0493) (.0479)
Thailand .1404*** .4146*** .0213
(.0360) (.0712) (.0407)
Year of immigration
(Omitted 1988)
1989 .0045 -.0112 .0208
(.0142) (.0228) (.0186)
1990 .0067 -.0135 .0207
(.0152) (.0241) (.0197)
1991 .0095 .0207 .0075
(.0161) (.0278) (.0202)
1992 -.0007 .0117 .0018
(.0158) (.0283) (.0198)
1993 .0205 .0811** .0072
(.0183) (.0398) (.0214)
1994 .0015 .0872 -.0138
(.0249) (.0640) (.0278)
Female -.0332***
(.0109)
Age at immigration -.0030*** .0038*** .0025***
(.0004) (.0006) (.0005)
Observation 8142 2945 5197
is shown in Figure A.1, Appendix A. Figure A.1 presents that the unemployment
rate was slightly increasing before 1992, which is consistent with the increasing out-
migration probability before 1992 in table 4.3; and the unemployment rate in 1993
is the highest in Norway during 1988-1994. This result may reflect causal economic
dependence, but the heterogeneity with respect to the Norwegian immigration policy
differ in each year, immigration motives and etc, is also likely to generate a different
out-migration probability by years.
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The remaining column 1 of table 4.3 show that the coefficient of ‘Age at immi-
gration’ is significant negative on the all immigrants, which means that the older
immigrants are when they move to the destination country, the more likely they are
to out-migrate later. However table 4.3 fails to provide more detailed information
about how the probability of out-migration is exactly influenced by the ‘age at im-
migration’ groups. Thus I estimate the out-migration probability by dividing the
aggregate ‘Age at immigration’ into 6 period groups7 individually listed in table 4.4.
Table 4.4: Out-migration Probability, by Age at Immigration
All Males Females
(1) (2)
Age at immigration groups
(Omitted 0-20 years old)
21-30 years old .0037 .0408 -.0188
(.0152) (.0280) (.0185)
31-40 years old -.0035 .0425 -.0365**
(.0166) (.0315) (.0191)
41-50 years old .0111 .1101*** -.0498**
(.0226) (.0440) (.0241)
51-60 years old .0834*** .0987** .0724**
(.0335) (.0586) (.0413)
≥ 61 years old .2749*** .3109*** .2520***
(.0406) (.0701) (.0504)
Observation 8,142 2,945 5,197
Table 4.4 implies that male immigrants start large-scale out-migration at age 40
while female immigrants start at age 50. For male immigrants, the coefficients of
age at immigration are approximately increasing all over the 6 groups of ‘Age at
immigration’ groups, however, the coefficients for females are decreasing until ‘Age
at immigration’ is 51 years old. These results are consistent with the hypothesis
that male immigrants seem to out-migrate from the beginning of their immigration,
once they found out the staying in Norway was not as they expected; the young
female immigrants are more likely to invest some time in the host country, and
they emigrate when they become old. In other words, female immigrants are more
influenced by the ‘investment approach’ effects, while male immigrants are more
influenced by the ‘mistakes approach’ effects.
Perhaps a good way to understand the out-migration probability for male immi-
grants of table 4.3 is to illustrate the relationship for these four country immigrants
between GDP per capita and the out-migration probability from the destination
7The immigrants whose ‘Age at immigration’ are younger than 16 are removed in the regression.
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country. As table 4.5 shows, the ranking of GDP per capita for these four South
Asian countries during 1988-1994 is ‘Thailand > Philippines > China > Vietnam’,
which is consistent with the coefficients of out-migration for men in table 4.3 ‘Thai-
land > Philippines > China > Vietnam’. However the coefficients of out-migration
probability for female immigrants column 3 of table 4.3 do not fit in this analy-
sis, thus the coefficients for the total immigrants column 1 of table 4.3 cannot be
explained by the ranking of GDP per capita either.
Table 4.5: GDP Per Capita (Constant 2000 US$) 1988-1994, Source: the World
Bank
GDP per capita 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Thailand 1202 1331 1462 1568 1675 1792 1931
Philippines 880 913 918 892 875 873 891
China 373 383 392 422 476 536 600
Vietnam 210 221 227 235 251 266 284
4.4 Summary
We have seen that out-migration decisions of immigrants are linked with the class
of admission and the economic situation of source country and host country.
• More than 40% male Chinese immigrants emigrate within 5 years living in
Norway while 97% male Vietnamese immigrants and 95% female Vietnamese
immigrants still live in Norway.
• Immigrants from China based on work permit have the highest out-migration
rates and immigrants from Vietnam reunified with refugees and familiy reuni-
fication has the lowest propensities to out-migrate.
• The female immigrants who are admitted by family reunification are less likely
to out-migrate than male immigrants.
• The male immigrants from the richer source countries are more likely to out-
migrate. And immigrants are more likely to out-migrate when the economic
situation become worse in the host country.
Chapter 5
Economic Assimilation
In this section I use a regression framework to do three things: First I compare the
relative earnings growth of immigrants in a fixed effects model with growth measured
in a cross-sectional model. It illustrates how cohort effects and selective emigration
may bias the results in cross-sectional model. Even if it is the Chinese males are
the most likely to emigrate, it is important to analyze whether it is the low-wage
immigrants who leave or the opposite. The other interesting question is whether
there is a cohort effect difference between Chinese males and Vietnamese males over
the period or not, since their types of class of admission are quite different. Thus the
empirical evidence on cohort effects and selective out-migration for Chinese males
and Vietnamese males are individually discussed. Then this section tries to explore
the economic assimilation patterns for married female immigrants by describing the
wage differences between female immigrants married to immigrants or natives. In
the end the earnings profiles of females related to children are separately estimated
by marriage groups. The employment rate, as the other important economic assimi-
lation indicator, estimated by synthetic panel model, will also be studied in the end
of this section.
5.1 Earnings of immigrant men
The empirical analysis reported throughout this section is based on the estimates
of eq.3.5, 3.6, and 3.11: the two cross-sectional model, and one fixed effects model1.
The Appendix B of this thesis presents the complete set of variables used in the
analysis (table B.1 and B.2 respectively present the estimated cross-sectional model
1The fixed effects model is for both immigrants and natives.
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for males and for females; table B.3 and B.4 individually provide the estimated fixed
effects model for males and for females.)
Figure 5.1 presents a clear male earnings assimilation profile for the cross-sectional
model of table B.1, Appendix B. It is obvious that the four groups of immigrants all
start with much lower earnings than the natives, however, as time passes and they
gain experience in the Norwegian labour market, their earnings rise more rapidly.
This is denoted by the steeper slopes of immigrant earnings over ages in figure 5.1.
Using eq.3.8, the economic assimilation can be based on the comparison of the
predicted earnings and employment profiles of immigrants and natives. Moreover,
the earnings gaps between natives and immigrants for each age are listed in table
5.12 for each of the source country. It shows that the earnings gaps between natives
and males from these four country all tend to get smaller with age. For example,
the Filipino males who are 26 years old report about 33.0% lower earnings than that
of the native males, but this gap is reduced to 11.7% when they are 35 years old,
and then it slowly increases onwards. The Filipino males economically assimilate
(α∗ > 0 in eq.3.8.) in the Norwegian labour market before they are 35 years old.
Similar qualitative conclusions can be drawn for all the groups: Chinese males as-
similate over time but they have the largest earnings gap to that of natives, Thai
and Vietnamese males all assimilate before they are 39 years old.
The method in Chapter 3 describes how the fixed effects model accounts the
individual unobserved earnings potential and tracks the time entry for each person
in the longitudinal data. As a result, the fixed effects model takes account of the
cohort effects and selective out-migration. Figure 5.2 shows the fixed effects earnings
profiles for males which is based on the estimated results in table B.2, Appendix B.
One result shown in figure 5.2 and figure 5.1 is that the measured native and
Chinese immigrant earnings growth is considerably stronger in the cross-sectional
model than in the fixed effects model, but opposite for the Vietnamese males. For
instance, the cross-sectional figure suggests that the natives’ relative earnings grow
by 36% from 12.45 to 12.81 in the period between age 25 and 40. By contrast,
in the fixed effects figure, natives’ earnings grow by 30% from 12.60 to 12.90 in
the same age period. The difference in earnings may be caused by native males
who have low earnings either emigrate Norway or have been excluded from the
Norwegian labour market. On the male immigrants side, according to the cross-
2The earnings gap can be derived from the cross-sectional figure 5.1 by using Earning gap =
lnWnj − lnWij .
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Table 5.1: Cross-sectional Earnings Gap between Immigrant and Native for Males
Age Philippines Chinese Thai Vietnamese
26 0.330 0.607 0.483 0.481
27 0.275 0.568 0.499 0.445
28 0.229 0.536 0.497 0.413
29 0.193 0.509 0.481 0.383
30 0.165 0.486 0.455 0.357
31 0.144 0.468 0.423 0.333
32 0.130 0.454 0.388 0.312
33 0.121 0.443 0.353 0.295
34 0.117 0.435 0.320 0.281
35 0.117 0.429 0.290 0.270
36 0.120 0.425 0.266 0.262
37 0.125 0.423 0.249 0.257
38 0.132 0.422 0.238 0.254
39 0.140 0.422 0.234 0.253
40 0.149 0.423 0.238 0.255
41 0.157 0.424 0.247 0.258
42 0.165 0.424 0.262 0.262
43 0.172 0.425 0.281 0.266
44 0.177 0.425 0.302 0.271
45 0.180 0.425 0.322 0.275
46 0.181 0.423 0.338 0.278
47 0.179 0.421 0.348 0.279
48 0.174 0.417 0.348 0.276
49 0.166 0.413 0.334 0.271
50 0.155 0.407 0.302 0.261
sectional figure, the earnings gap3 between Chinese male immigrants and natives
is reduced by 55% within the first 15 years they have been in Norway. The gap
found in fixed effects model is 45%, the Chinese males still have the largest earnings
gap to the natives, compared to other country immigrants. The overestimated
gap differences in earnings growth for Chinese male immigrants between the cross-
sectional model and fixed effects model may be biased either by the emigration of
low-earnings Chinese males or the cohort effects that the earlier arrived Chinese have
higher earnings than the later arrived Chinese. The understated earnings gap for the
Vietnamese males in the cross-sectional model is 55% versus 69% in the fixed effects
model. This gap differences in earnings growth for Vietnamese male immigrants
between these two models may be biased either by the emigration of high-earnings
Vietnamese males or the opposite cohort effects that the later arrived Vietnamese
have higher earnings than the earlier ones. Given the assumption that earlier arrived
3The Chinese males’ relative earnings (log annual earnings) grow from 11.85 (age 25) to 12.40
(age 40) in the cross-sectional figure and 11.85 to 12.30 in the fixed effects figure
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Figure 5.1: Cross-sectional Estimates Earnings Profiles for Males
Figure 5.2: Fixed Effects Estimates Earnings Profiles for Males
cohorts have better labour market attachment to get higher earnings than the later
arrived cohorts, the estimation results in the cross-sectional model will be biased
downwards. And if the immigrants who do not do well in Norway are more likely to
emigrate, the coefficients in the cross-sectional model will be biased upwards, since
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the earlier cohorts of immigrants will have been self-selected to include only the most
successful immigrants. Thus the Chinese males and Vietnamese males’ selective out-
migration and cohort effects will be discussed later. However for the male immigrants
from Philippines and Thailand, there is not much difference in earnings growth
between cross-sectional figure and fixed effects figure. This is consistent with the
results in the previous section that these two country immigrants are less likely to
emigrate from Norway over time.
5.1.1 Selective out-migration among Chinese males
The process of selective out-migration for Chinese men is demonstrated in figure
5.3. Fortunately, the available emigration data allow me to divide the periods of
immigrant stay into 6 groups: stay 1-2, 3-4, 5-6, 7-8, 9-10 years and permanently
in Norway. Figure 5.2 clearly presents that the lowest earnings Chinese males out-
migrate fastest. The Chinese males who stay 5-6 years in Norway have roughly 11.5
log income at the third year since immigration, however, those who stay 3-4 years
have only 11.25 log income in the same year. As a result, the out-migration of the
lower payment Chinese males make the cross-sectional graph 5.2 to be overestimated.
5.1.2 Cohorts among Chinese males
Consistent with the prior assumption, the Chinese male decreasing cohort effects
might also bias upward the cross-sectional results.
According to data registered in 2005, nearly 20 percent of the Chinese males
are reported not being employed.4 Based on the 80 percent Chinese males who
are registered to be employed, figure 5.4 plots the earnings profiles for native males
(the solid line) and Chinese males by the six cohorts5. It should be remarked that
the earliest Chinese immigrant cohort (1970s Arrivals) can not be explained since
they are already conditioned on those who still work until 1990 and the emigration
of this cohort can generate bias. However the across-cohort growth6 in the other
cohorts is almost zero for Chinese male immigrants. For example, the most recent
cohort (2000-05 Arrivals) and the earlier cohort both have around 12.2 log income
4They might work in restaurants without tax registration, or some other reasons.
5The longitudinal data allow this thesis to calculate the number for six periods cohorts: 1970s,
1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-05 arrivals.
6The "across-cohort" earnings growth compares the different cohorts at the same point of their
host country life cycle (see Borjas (1985)).
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Figure 5.3: Chinese Male Selective Out-migration
in 2005 and in 2000 respectively. Thus the zero across-cohort growth indicates that,
relative to the native males, the unobserved earnings potential of Chinese male
immigrants is constant over time, not biasing the cross-sectional growth in their
earnings. Furthermore, during the period of recession (1990-94) the labour market
attachment of Chinese males is the same as the other cohorts, reflecting that the
Norwegian immigration policies towards Chinese males remain the same regardless
of the economic situation in Norway and do not change in the whole period.
One other result shown in figure 5.4 is the years since migration effects(YSM).7
It is obvious that the earliest Chinese male cohort, stay longest, and has the highest
earnings and the smallest gap to natives, compared to the other cohorts. And the
detailed job information for each cohort are listed later. In sum, this verifies the
hypothesis that the immigrants who stay longer in the host country will gain more
experience and skills to improve their earnings than the immigrants who stay shorter.
7It should be noticed that the YSM effects are different to the cohort effects: YSM means the
time immigrants spend in the host country, but cohort effects is the labour market attachment of
the immigrants who arrived in one particular period.
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Figure 5.4: Chinese Male Year Since Migration Effects (YSM)
5.1.3 The role of industry assimilation
Table 5.2 lists the percentage of three industry sectors8 and relative earnings for
individual cohort of Chinese males, based on the industry data in 2005. This table
clearly presents that the recent arrived cohorts are more likely to work at restaurants
and get much lower payments, compared to the earlier arrived cohorts. Meanwhile,
the earnings of Chinese males working at restaurants are much lower than that
of natives. For instance, the 1970-79 arrivals cohort get the highest payment, 33
percent of this cohort work in the education sector, and only 25 percent work in the
restaurant sector.9 By contrast, the percentage working at restaurants for a later
cohort (1985-89 Arrivals) is increased to 60 percent. Thus the later arrived Chinese
male cohorts who are working at restaurants and get much lower payments than
that of natives dominate the estimated low earnings profiles in the figures for the
Chinese males.
8Generally, the cohorts focus on the three sectors in 2005: Restaurant, Health and Social
Services and Education.
9The earliest cohort could also have worked at restaurants before and changed their jobs in
2005.
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Table 5.2: Industry Descriptive Statistics of Chinese Males by Cohort, based on the
industry observation in 2005.
Restaurant Health and Education
Social Service
Period of arrival: (%) lnW (%) lnW (%) lnW
1970-79 25.00 12.11 33.33 12.85
1980-84 29.17 11.98 4.17 12.20 29.17 12.97
1985-89 54.29 11.87 14.86 12.60 4.00 12.82
1990-94 42.16 11.94 15.69 11.63 4.90 12.92
1995-99 24.04 11.98 21.15 11.92 9.62 12.83
2000-05 33.63 11.53 9.73 12.08 21.24 12.31
Observations 290 98 107
Natives 1.43 12.47 12.43 12.47 9.16 12.72
Observations 331 5,209 4,131
5.1.4 Earnings of native and Chinese men in the restaurant
sector
Figure 5.5 displays the cross-sectional earnings profile estimated separately for restau-
rant employees of Chinese men versus native men and non-restaurant employees of
Chinese men versus native men. This figure not only verifies that the earnings profile
of the Chinese men are dominated by those lower payed working at restaurants, but
also implies that the difference in the education level10, job places and positions be-
tween Chinese and native males are displayed in the following three gap differences:
First, the gap between Chinese and native who are working at restaurants is much
larger and increasing considerably over time, in contrast to the gap of other two.
Second, the earnings of the Chinese men who are working in some other sectors are
still below the restaurant natives. Third, the modest gap between natives who are
working at restaurants and native who are not working at restaurants is consistent
with they have similar level of education.
The other approach is to divide the Chinese males and native males into high
and low education groups 11 and estimate in fixed effects models. Same results of
earnings compare in restaurants and non-restaurants as the previous cross-sectional
figure 5.5: for those males having low education, the earnings gap between Chinese
10The average years of education levels are: 12.38, 3.48,13.14 and 6.43 for native men working at
restaurants, Chinese men working at restaurants, native men who are not working at restaurants,
and Chinese men who are not working at restaurants respectively.
11High education is defined with the number of years of schooling beyond 12 years. The low
education is defined with the number of years of schooling less than 12 years.
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Figure 5.5: Chinese Male Work Restaurant VS. Not Work Restaurant, based on the
occupation observation in 2005.
and natives are much larger and increasing over time, compared to the earnings gap
between Chinese and natives who have high education. And the earnings of Chinese
males with high education are still below the earnings of low educated natives.
Figure 5.6: Chinese Male VS. Native Male, by Education Group
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5.1.5 Selective out-migration among Vietnamese males
The Vietnamese male selective out-migration process is depicted in figure 5.7. It
expresses a really random phenomenon for the earnings of Vietnamese males in each
period of staying, which is quite different to that of Chinese males in figure 5.3.
Unfortunately, the figure 5.7 is not sufficient to explain the out-migration patterns,
since only less than 8% of the Vietnamese men left Norway during 1967-2003.12
Figure 5.7: Vietnamese Male Selective Out-migration
5.1.6 Cohorts among Vietnamese males
Figure 5.8 shows the earnings profiles for native males (solid line) and Vietnamese
males by the six cohorts. Without considering the earliest cohort (1970s Arrivals), it
is found that the increased unobserved earnings potential of Vietnamese males is only
obtained for those who arrived in 1995-99. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that the recent cohort having higher labour market attachment would make cross-
sectional earnings profile to be biased downwardly. On the other hand, the earlier
1990-94 arrival cohort seems to have lower labour market attachment than other
12In table 4.1
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cohorts. However, this might be caused by the business cycle, since the better
Vietnamese males have difficulties entering in Norway during that recession period
(1990-94). The earliest arrived Vietnamese males who stay longer also have achieved
higher earnings than those who arrived later and stay shorter.
Figure 5.8: Vietnamese Male Year Since Migration Effects(YSM)
5.2 Earnings of immigrant women
Figure 5.9 and figure 5.10 report results from the cross-sectional model and fixed
effects model based on the earnings regression results13 for females. It is obvious
that the earnings of native females have a steeper rise in figure 5.10 than in figure
5.9.14 Some native females during age 25-40 having higher labour market attach-
ment enter into the labour market later, which makes the cross-sectional estimation
to be understated. This suggests that the cross-sectional figure is understated by
omitting the birth cohort effects of native females. The native females who are born
13In table B.2 and table B.4, Appendix B.
14The native female earnings growth is 15% in cross-sectional figure and 29% in fixed effect figure
during the first 15 yeas in Norway.
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later have higher unobserved earnings potential than those born earlier, reflecting
the correlation for native females between the birth year and unobserved earnings
potential is positive15. For the female immigrants, there is not much difference
between in relative earnings growth in the cross-sectional figure and fixed effects
figure.
According to figure 5.10, the earnings of native women increase by more than 42%
over the life cycle, compared to an increase of more than 23% for native men in figure
5.2. In Norway, earnings growth of native females still increases faster after age 40;
earnings growth of native men is faster16 between age 25 and 40. Similar results as
the faster earnings growth of native females than native males, the earnings growth
for female immigrants from Philippines, China and Thailand is also faster than those
of immigrant men. But the earnings growth speed for Vietnamese women is 10%
slower than Vietnamese men. For all female immigrants, wage growth is notably
fast when they are young before 40 years old, compared to the native females. Thus
the figure 5.10 reveals considerable assimilation effects on these female immigrants.
During age 25 to 40, the earnings of immigrants women grow by 54%, 61%, 62%
and 52% respectively in figure 5.10 while that of the native women is 29%.
Figure 5.9: Cross-sectional Earnings Profiles for Females, by Countries
15correlation(byear, u) = 0.3051
16The native men have almost the same earnings growth (30%) as that of women (29%)
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Figure 5.10: Fixed Effects Earnings Profiles for Females, by Countries
5.3 The role of marital status
In this section, the difference in earnings assimilation outcomes across married female
immigrants from these four South Asian countries will be studied by dividing the
married female immigrants into two groups: female immigrants married to natives
and those married to immigrants. Does the earnings assimilation results differ by
trans-national marriages? Are there any differences in earnings outcomes between
these four country’s married female immigrants? Which factors can explain the
variation in earnings outcomes of female immigrants who are married to natives and
those who are married to immigrants? Does the number and age of children showing
a negative influence on earnings performance of females, and are there any children
effect differences between immigrant females and natives?
To provide background, table 5.3 lists sample means for key variables separately
for female immigrants 17 who are married to immigrants and those who are married
to natives.
The married females from the Philippines and Vietnam have roughly 2 more
years of residence than those of China and Thailand. However the longer periods
of residence is not necessary to have higher earnings. For example, the Chinese
17The female immigrants are conditional on the annual earnings is larger than 50,000 Kroner to
ensure that they are employed.
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Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of Marriages for Female Immigrants. Descriptive
Statistics of Marriages for Female Immigrants. The employment rate (Empl Rate)
for females are conditional on having real annual earnings >50,000 NOK which is
fully employed; sp prefix refers to spouse and sp lnrnet means spouse’s log annual
income; Edmiss is the missing registration of education.
Variable Philippines China Thailand Vietnam
Marry imm: Mean StdDevMean StdDevMean StdDevMean StdDev
ln(Annual Earnings) 12.507 0.508 12.074 0.559 12.093 0.516 12.227 0.510
Age 38.151 7.267 38.233 7.301 36.084 6.593 37.707 7.244
YSM 10.476 6.489 8.403 5.381 7.958 5.449 10.928 5.729
Age difference 2.181 6.806 3.410 5.565 5.182 10.594 3.165 4.910
Educ 6.191 7.209 8.060 6.856 6.243 5.688 8.233 5.440
Edmiss 0.438 0.496 0.285 0.452 0.322 0.467 0.161 0.368
Empl Rate 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Children 1.930 1.191 1.606 0.896 1.448 1.122 2.787 1.535
City 0.715 0.452 0.760 0.427 0.602 0.490 0.691 0.462
Countryside 0.285 0.452 0.240 0.427 0.398 0.490 0.309 0.462
sp lnrnet 12.424 0.952 12.144 0.930 12.320 1.276 12.295 1.106
sp age 40.332 9.631 41.642 8.687 41.266 11.044 40.871 8.188
sp educ 5.596 7.109 7.625 6.916 5.471 5.713 7.903 5.568
sp edmiss 0.499 0.500 0.324 0.468 0.412 0.492 0.195 0.396
sp emp 0.898 0.302 0.904 0.294 0.818 0.386 0.872 0.334
Observations 10322 6940 1911 18885
Marry natives:
ln(Annual Earnings) 12.159 0.531 12.240 0.670 12.083 0.519 12.198 0.582
Age 37.565 6.967 35.992 6.493 36.893 6.860 37.780 7.697
YSM 9.651 5.879 7.754 5.121 7.759 5.710 10.015 6.922
Age difference 9.309 8.945 6.174 7.994 8.660 8.730 6.214 7.859
Educ 7.169 6.923 11.379 7.255 5.841 5.828 10.611 6.398
Edmiss 0.404 0.491 0.191 0.393 0.325 0.468 0.204 0.403
Empl Rate 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000
Children 1.552 1.120 1.191 0.843 1.365 1.157 1.572 1.228
City 0.474 0.499 0.659 0.474 0.496 0.500 0.648 0.478
Countryside 0.526 0.499 0.341 0.474 0.504 0.500 0.352 0.478
sp lnrnet 12.464 1.144 12.656 1.110 12.493 1.173 12.670 1.038
sp age 46.874 10.453 42.167 10.042 45.553 10.306 43.994 10.313
sp educ 7.077 6.928 11.259 7.298 5.741 5.823 10.586 6.412
sp edmiss 0.413 0.492 0.198 0.399 0.338 0.473 0.206 0.404
sp emp 0.840 0.367 0.919 0.273 0.860 0.347 0.915 0.279
Observations 20565 1594 16717 1128
females who married to natives stay the shortest time (average 7.75 years of res-
idence) but they achieve the highest earnings. All the endogamic married female
immigrants significantly prefer city to countryside, while those exogamic females
from Thailand and the Philippines are more likely to live in countryside than city.
The table also shows that female immigrants who come from China and marry with
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natives have the highest education level, which is consistent with them having the
highest earnings outcomes among the females in the exogemic marriages. Nearly
66.6% of the Philippine women and 90% of the Thai women married native men,
by contrast 94.4% of the Vietnamese women married immigrants. Generally, the
age difference between husband and wife is bigger for exogamic marriages than for
endogamic marriages. Further, this age difference is largest for the Philippine fe-
males who married natives (around 9.3 years older). The native men involved in
a trans-national marriage with Chinese and Vietnamese women have the highest
education, employment rate and relative earnings among those of other native men.
The endogamic married female immigrants have the similar number of children as
the exdogamic married female immigrants, except the Vietnamese women married
to immigrants have around 2 times as many children as the others.
5.3.1 Life cycle earnings difference
The cross-sectional and fixed effects earnings profiles for the married females are
displayed in figure 5.11 and figure 5.12 respectively.18 The results show that the
earnings growth of natives and immigrants in the cross-sectional model do not differ
as much as that of the fixed effects model. It means that the earnings growth for
the married native and immigrant females measured in the cross-sectional model is
not biased by the effects of selective out-migration and cohort effects. Moreover,
both figures clearly demonstrate that the Philippine females married to immigrants
and Chinese females married to natives have the best economic performances: they
assimilate faster than any of the others in the first 15 years of residence in Norway
and the earnings is even higher than those of native females. Such as in figure 5.12,
after staying 15 years, the earnings of Chinese and Philippine females respectively
grow fully double and 49 percent, compared to when they arrived. However, for Thai
and Vietnamese females, there is almost no earnings difference between exogamic
marriages and that of endogamic.
As a result, Philippine females who married with similar aged immigrant hus-
bands, even without high education, stay longest in Norway and get the highest
earnings. This implies that they have more knowledge of the language relevant
to Norwegian jobs, have more information about Norwegian job opportunities, have
much higher motivation than the others, or work in higher payed sectors in the cities.
The Chinese females who are involved in trans-national marriages, stay shortest in
18The regression results are in Table B.7-B.10 Appendix B.
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Figure 5.11: Cross-sectional Earnings Profiles for Married Females, by Countries
 
Figure 5.12: Fixed Effects Earnings Profiles for Married Females, by Countries
Norway, have the highest education themselves and their husbands, have the highest
earnings.
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5.3.2 Children and earnings
To show how the number and the age of children influence the female earnings,
the children indication variables for each married woman are divided into 6 age
groups: 0, 1, 2, 3-6, 7-12, 13-18 years old. The children who are more than 18 years
old will be reference group. Adding these children indication variables, figure 5.13
and figure 5.14 individually present the cross-sectional and fixed effects estimated
results for immigrant and native females.19 Same results as the previous section 5.2,
there is not much difference in earnings growth between figure 5.13 and figure 5.14
except the cross-sectional earnings profile understates life cycle earnings growth for
native females. This is because of the birth cohort effects of native females. The
native females who born later have better unobserved earnings potential than those
of earlier birth cohort, possibly reflecting that the later born native females have a
stronger attachment to the labour market. It can be also reflected in the correlation
for native females between the birth year and innate abilities is positive20. The slope
of earnings for native females, when children effects are considered in figure 5.14,
becomes more concave than the one without children effects (figure 5.12). However,
the earnings slopes of immigrant females do not seem to be much affected by the
children effects. This interesting phenomenon indicates that the Norwegian child
welfare policy might have different impacts on native and immigrant women.
Moreover, the regression results in table B.15-B.16, Appendix B show that the
younger children’s age dummy, the stronger negative effects of reducing the earnings
of native females. Based on the children age dummy coefficients in table B.15-B.16,
Appendix B, figure 5.15 and figure figure 5.15 express clearly how female earnings
measured in fixed effects model are influenced by children. 21
For the married native woman who have children, figure 5.15(or figure 5.16)
verifies the same results in the table B.15 - B.16, Appendix B that the earnings of
native females are tremendously reduced when their children’s age are between 0-2
years old. For example, the earnings of native females are reduced by 6.44% the
year the child is born (0 year old), in comparison to the earnings of native females
without children, which are reduced by 15.21% when the child is 1 year old; 10.57%
when the child is 2 years old, 7.36% when the child is 3-6 years old; 3.97% when
the child is 7-12 years old; and 1.7% when the child is 13-18 years old. The results
19The estimation results are in table B.14 and table B.15, Appendix B.
20correlation(byear, u) = 0.3412
21The regression results are in table B.15-B.16, Appendix B.
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Figure 5.13: Cross-sectional Earnings Profiles for Married Females with Children,
by Countries
 
Figure 5.14: Fixed Effects Earnings Profiles for Married Females with Children, by
Countries
may link to the Norwegian welfare policies that the females have the right to leave
of absence with full payment for 10 months or 80% payment for 1 year (12 months)
when the child is born. They can also reduce their working hours when the child is
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Figure 5.15: Fixed Effects Impact of Childbearing on Earnings of Native Females
and Endogamic Married Female Immigrants
 
Figure 5.16: Fixed Effects Impact of Childbearing on Earnings of Native and Ex-
ogamic Female Married Immigrants
young.
The children effects on the earnings of female immigrants over time are generally
much smaller than that of natives. And the children effects seem to have positive ef-
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fects22 on the earnings of Chinese females when they have young children. However,
the children effects on the earnings of Thai and Vietnamese females who married
trans-nationally are significantly more negative than that of natives females when
they have children between 1 and 2 years old. This implies that the female immi-
grants may work in different sectors of the Norwegian labour market, compared to
the native females. Even if the female immigrants have the same rights as the native
females, they seem less likely to reduce their working hours when they have children
during 25-35 years old. It is also reflected in figure 5.18 (in next section) that their
employment rates assimilate fastest during that age period.
5.4 Employment patterns of immigrants and na-
tives over the life cycle
Since the data do not provide direct employment information, I construct a variable
based on their annual earnings, defining an individual as being employed in a given
year if they earned income exceed 50,000 Kroner in Norway. Based on the synthetic
panel model23(eq.3.12 and eq.3.13), the analysis of employment rate is first sepa-
rately estimated by genders and the results are shown in figrue 5.17 and table B.5,
Appendix B for males; figure 5.18 and table B.6, Appendix B for females. Then the
analysis of employment rate is divided by immigrant marriage types and the results
shown in figure 5.19 and table B.11-B.12, Appendix B.
The profiles of immigrant males (figure 5.17) and females (figure 5.18) show rapid
growth in employment rate during the first ten years24 in Norway. The employment
rates of male immigrants from China and Vietnam are substantially below those of
natives compare to that of Thailand and the Philippines. Further, employment rates
of native women are below those of men, showing some decline between the age 25
and 30, rising between the age 35 and 45. In sum, the evidence reveals tremendous
assimilation effects on employment during the first ten years of residence, for both
male and female immigrants.
Figure 5.19 shows the employment profiles for married female immigrants and
22The interaction terms of children effects on Chinese females are significant positive in table
B.15-B.16, Appendix B.
23The year dummies (the period effects) are omitted, since the employment rate curvature of
natives over time is almost the same as that of immigrants who came before 1970.
24In the thesis, both Age and YSM can be used to express the immigrants stay for Y SM =
Age− 25
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Figure 5.17: Employment Profiles for Males, by Countries
Figure 5.18: Employment Profiles for Females, by Countries
that of natives. It is obvious that the Philippine females who married with immi-
grants and the Vietnamese females married trans-nationally respectively have the
fastest growth and the slowest growth in employment rate during the first ten years
in Norway. And the employment rate of Chinese females who are married to natives
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Figure 5.19: Employment Profiles for Married Females, by Countries
starts declining when they are 35 years old.
5.5 Summary
• The earnings growth for the Chinese males is overestimated in the cross-
sectional model by the selective out-migration.
• The earnings growth for the native females is understated in the cross-sectional
model by the younger birth cohorts having higher labour market attachment.
• For native females, there are significant negative effects of having children
on earnings. The earnings of female immigrants are less affected by having
Children.
• Over the life cycle female immigrants catch up with native women in terms of
economic status and fully intergrated in the Norwegian labour market.
Chapter 6
Discussion
Based on the theories and methods of migration and economic assimilation, we find
the patterns of immigrant flows and economic assimilation process for these four
country immigrants. There are three interesting questions raised from the theories
and results of this study.
The first question is, what are the differences between Vietnamese male refugee
immigrants and Chinese male labour immigrants? These groups are more likely
to have different class of admission, and this question could reflect how these two
classes of admission affect different economic assimilation results. Based on previ-
ous research we should expect non-refugee (work permit) immigrants have higher
employment rate and earn more than refugee immigrants. Yet the Vietnamese male
refugee immigrants seem to do much better in the Norwegian labour market with
respect to employment rate and earnings capacity than non-refugee Chinese immi-
grants. This may be related to the fact that the average number of years the male
Vietnamese immigrants have spent in Norway are 3 years more than that of Chinese.
And Vietnamese refugees also have less family ties, are motivated to stay longer and
they get higher earnings in Norway while most Chinese males work at restaurants
with low payments.
The second one is aimed at comparing recently arrived Chinese with lately ar-
rived Chinese. The findings suggest that there are no significant cohort effects for
Chinese males, but the least successful Chinese males leave Norway fastest. Fur-
ther, this selective out-migration indeed leads the results of cross-sectional earnings
assimilation to be overestimated.
The third question inquires endogamic marriages and exogamic marriages among
female immigrants may affect their migration decisions and economic assimilation re-
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sults in the Norwegian labour market. This question helps us to understand whether
the female immigrants who were admitted for family reunification with native males
more often prefer to stay and get higher earnings because their native husbands1
help them to easier assimilate in the Norwegian labour market. Most Vietnamese
and Chinese females are married to immigrants, which is quite opposite to Thai
and Philippine females. Firstly, the results do not support a thesis about a direct
linkage between native husbands and higher earnings immigrant wives. But some
other factors of the female immigrants themselves seem to be more determined
for their earnings such as education, age and living environment. For instance,
Chinese females who are married to natives, have the highest education; and the
Filipino females who are married to immigrants, stay longest time in Norway to-
gether with their similar aged husbands; have the best assimilation in employment
rate and earnings among the others. And there is no much difference in economic
assimilation difference for female immigrants from Thailand and Vietnam between
endogamic marriages and exogamic marriages. Secondly, the endogamic married
Chinese females mostly emigrate with their husbands while the endogamic married
Vietnamese females much prefer to stay. As a result, the earnings assimilation pat-
terns and migration decisions of married female immigrants seem to be determined
by the heterogeneous factors of female immigrants themselves.
1The native men involved in trans-national marriages with female immigrants from the four
counties.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
The objective of this thesis is to study the economic assimilation of immigrants
from four South Asian countries: Philippines, China, Thailand and Vietnam. I first
show inflow and outflow patterns for immigrants. Utilizing cross-sectional and fixed
effects methods I then analyze the immigrant earnings assimilation patterns.
Using individual longitudinal migration data, this thesis finds out that more
than 33,000 immigrants from China, Vietnam, Philippine and Thailand arrived in
Norway between 1967-2003. About 82 percent of them remained in the country at
the beginning of 2004.
Most Vietnamese immigrants were granted as refugees; female immigrants from
Philippines, Thailand and China were more likely to enter due to family reunifica-
tion; Chinese males mostly came as labour immigrants. At the same time, many
immigrants to Norway do not remain in the country throughout their life. Some
permanently leave the country and others leave and reenter later. Both types of
emigration decisions bias the earnings progress of immigrants estimated in the cross-
sectional model. The out-migration of low-earnings male Chinese immigrants leads
to an over-estimation of earnings growth in the cross-sectional method. Moreover,
the out-migration patterns are closely related to the class of admission. We have
also seen that almost all refugee Vietnamese males and females stay in Norway;
more than 40% male Chinese labour immigrants emigrate within 5 years of arrival.
Different to male immigrants are the primary migrants, the female immigrants are
more likely to be granted permission to stay for family reunification and they stay
longer than men. For instance only less than 20% Thai females and 27% Filipino
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females left after 10 years. This is consistent with the evidence shown in Marcela
and Massey (2001) that women are motivated by different factors than those of men.
Additionally, in comparison with primary refugees, the student immigrants are more
likely to leave Norway.
Not all immigrants who out-migrate from Norway return to their home countries.
Around 30 percent of immigrants from these four South Asian countries moved to a
third country during 1967-2003. And among the Vietnamese who left Norway, over
66 percent moved to a third country.
The immigrants’ out-migration probability not only relates to the GDP of the
source country, but also links to the economic situation of the host country. The
higher GDP of the source country and worse economic situation of the host coun-
try, the larger is the probability of out-migration. For instance, Thailand has the
highest GDP of these four countries, and Thai males have the highest out-migration
probability. These out-migration patterns are consistent with GDP of these four
source countries. But this does not fit for the female immigrants. On the other
hand, table 4.3 shows that in 1993, when it was a period of economic recession and
the unemployment rate was at its highest in Norway, the effects on immigrants’
out-migration probability was the highest among all the other years. This implies
that during that recession period, it was more difficult for immigrants to find work
than for natives.
This thesis analyzes the economic assimilation of these four country immigrants
by using individual data during 1980 to 2005. We have seen that the least success-
ful Chinese immigrants have left Norway, which causes a significant overestimated
earnings profile in the cross-sectional model. Moreover, quite a number of Chinese
men are working at restaurants and get lower payment than natives, and this fact
dominates earnings gap between Chinese men and natives in the fixed effects figure.
However, even if the male immigrants from the Philippines, Vietnam and Thailand
assimilate faster in their earnings growth during the first ten years in Norway, they
are still far behind the native level.
For the female immigrants, though they start with lower earnings than natives,
they assimilate considerably faster than male immigrants. The Filipino women even
catch up to the earnings of native females. And there are not much difference in the
results between the cross-sectional figures and the fixed effects figures for women
from these four countries, reflecting the estimators of the earnings growth in the
cross-sectional model are not biased by the effects of selective out-migration and
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cohort effects.
On the other hand, the earnings growth of native women is faster than native
men over the life cycle. It is interesting to find that the earnings growth of native
females in the cross-sectional model is understated. This is because of the positive
correlation for the native women between the birth year and the labour market
attachment. In other words, the later born native women have higher labour market
attachment than the earlier born native women in the labour market of Norway.
This study provides evidence for the earnings assimilation of female immigrants
by marriage types. The results do not show significant relationship between native
husbands and higher earnings of immigrant women who married trans-nationally.
However the earnings assimilation patterns for female immigrants by marriage types
show quite heterogeneity by the female themselves. For example, Chinese women
who are married to native men and Philippine women who are married to immigrants
are doing best among the married female immigrants. This could be because the
exogamic married Chinese females have the highest education, and the endogamic
Filipino females stay the longest in Norway and almost all of them live and work
in the cities. Meanwhile, there is not much earnings differences between exogamic
marriages or endogamic marriages for Thai and Vietnamese women.
The other key result of this thesis is that there are significant negative children
effects on earnings of native females, especially when the child is younger than
3 years old: The earnings of native females having children will maximumly be
reduced by 15.21%, compared by the earnings of native females without children.
These negative impacts become less influential as the children get older. However
the earnings of female immigrants do not seem to be affected very much by their
children. Only a few immigrant females from Thailand and Vietnam in exogamic
marriages have larger negative children effects on their earnings than native females
when the children are between 1 and 2 years old. This implies that the child welfare
policies in Norway have a different impact on native females and immigrant females.
The employment rate, as the other important indicator of economic assimilation,
verifies the fast assimilation speed for both males and females in the first ten years
in Norway. However the employment rates of male immigrants from China and
Vietnam are substantially below those of natives, compared to those of Thailand
and the Philippines. Of all the females, the Philippine females who are married to
immigrants and the Vietnamese females married trans-nationally have the fastest
and slowest growth respectively in employment rate during their first ten years in
60 CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Norway. Finally, the employment rates of native women are below those of native
men.
7.2 Future work
The class of admission data collected by Statistic Norway, which is only available for
the period 1988-94, may be biased in presenting the out-migration patterns over the
whole period of 1967-2003. However, the conclusion drawn from the out-migration
probability regression on the admission class types during 1988-94 is consistent with
the immigration flow results over the whole period.
It might be interesting to know more about how the out-migration patterns
for female immigrants in endogamic marriages differ to the female immigrants who
are married to natives, since female immigrants were mainly admitted for family
reunification. These two marriage types could have different migration decisions.
Furthermore, more work can be done with the data set available to get more
information about the working types of the endogamic married Filipino women and
the exogamic married Chinese women in the Norwegian labour market. This might
help to explain why the economic assimilation of these two groups is much better
than the others.
It would also be desirable to expand the analysis and include more data to
investigate why the Norwegian child welfare policies have a different impact on
native females and immigrant females.
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Appendix A
Figure A.1: Unemployment Rate in Norway, units are the percentage of the total
labour force. Source: International Monetary Fund - 2008 World Economic Outlook,
http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm
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Appendix B
In this appendix the following tables with the data are presented:
B.1 Log Earnings Regressions (Cross-sectional Model), Male Samples
B.2 Log Earnings Regressions (Cross-sectional Model), Female Samples
B.3 Log Earnings Regressions (Fixed Effects Model), Male Samples
B.4 Log Earnings Regressions (Fixed Effects Model), Female Samples
B.5 Employment Rate Regressions, Male Samples
B.6 Employment Rate Regressions, Female Samples
B.7 Log Earnings Regressions (Cross-sectional Model), Female Married
Immigrants Samples
B.8 Log Earnings Regressions (Cross-sectional Model), Female Married
Native Samples
B.9 Log Earnings Regressions (Fixed Effects Model), Female Married
Immigrants Samples
B.10 Log Earnings Regressions (Fixed Effects Model), Female Married
Native Samples
B.11 Employment Rate Regressions, Female Married
Immigrants Samples
B.12 Employment Rate Regressions, Female Married
Native Samples
B.13 Log Earnings Regressions with Children Effects (Fixed Effects Model),
Female Married Immigrant Samples
B.14 Log Earnings Regressions with Children Effects (Fixed Effects Model),
Female Married Native Samples
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 Table B-1: Log Earnings Regressions (Cross-sectional Model), Male Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.1064*** 0.06158*** 0.07858*** 0.09253*** 
 (20.296) (13.235) (4.5796) (23.102) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.6799*** -0.3331*** -0.3623* -0.4869*** 
 (-15.047) (-7.6248) (-2.1845) (-13.927) 
     
ysm3/1000 0.1411*** 0.06922*** 0.06902 0.09026*** 
 (12.791) (6.1626) (1.5604) (10.094) 
     
age 0.9540*** 0.9540*** 0.9537*** 0.9540*** 
 (31.502) (31.405) (31.474) (31.399) 
     
age2/10 -0.3262*** -0.3263*** -0.3262*** -0.3263*** 
 (-27.261) (-27.176) (-27.236) (-27.171) 
     
age3/1000 0.5018*** 0.5019*** 0.5017*** 0.5018*** 
 (24.334) (24.258) (24.312) (24.254) 
     
age4/100 -0.2920*** -0.2920*** -0.2919*** -0.2920*** 
 (-22.311) (-22.241) (-22.291) (-22.237) 
     
imm_age 0.06421 0.1036 -3.9353*** -0.7257*** 
 (0.1883) (0.3323) (-3.7264) (-3.9586) 
     
imm_age2/100 -0.6426 -0.5561 15.69*** 2.576*** 
 (-0.4823) (-0.4520) (3.6599) (3.5325) 
     
imm_age3/1000 0.1625 0.1137 -2.743*** -0.4113** 
 (0.7141) (0.5364) (-3.6063) (-3.2482) 
     
imm_age4/100000 -0.1314 -0.08344 1.767*** 0.2460** 
 (-0.9160) (-0.6190) (3.5503) (3.0338) 
     
educ 0.04004*** 0.03997*** 0.04028*** 0.03998*** 
 (247.00) (246.33) (247.31) (246.68) 
     
imm_educ -0.02094*** -0.01150*** -0.009628*** -0.02325*** 
 (-23.181) (-15.808) (-3.6921) (-37.613) 
     
edmiss 0.3217*** 0.2925*** 0.4200*** 0.2955*** 
 (32.389) (32.968) (36.095) (36.399) 
     
imm 0.2148 -1.0948 35.909*** 7.2523*** 
 (0.06681) (-0.3760) (3.7478) (4.2754) 
     
Constant 1.7741*** 1.7744*** 1.7736*** 1.7746*** 
 (6.2983) (6.2791) (6.2926) (6.2791) 
N 958700 960021 949567 982341 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Annual Earnings) which is conditional on employment that Annual Earnings > 
50,000 Kroner (2005 currency). The interaction terms are age and education variables for immigrants. The 
calculation uses the data from 1980-2005. 
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4;
€ 
imm _ age = imm × age ,imm _ age2 = imm × age2,imm _ age3= imm × age3,imm _ age4 = imm × age4;
€ 
imm _ educ = imm × educ. 
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 Table B-2: Log Earnings Regressions (Cross-sectional Model), Female Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.08312*** 0.09934*** 0.1311*** 0.08994*** 
 (24.599) (15.294) (28.612) (17.326) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.5150*** -0.5632*** -0.9232*** -0.5024*** 
 (-16.896) (-8.9343) (-20.237) (-10.949) 
     
ysm3/1000 0.1231*** 0.1080*** 0.2089*** 0.09314*** 
 (15.721) (6.3089) (16.372) (7.8253) 
     
age 0.5509*** 0.5508*** 0.5509*** 0.5508*** 
 (15.866) (15.889) (15.914) (15.907) 
     
age2/10 -0.2156*** -0.2156*** -0.2156*** -0.2156*** 
 (-15.724) (-15.747) (-15.771) (-15.765) 
     
age3/1000 0.3801*** 0.3800*** 0.3801*** 0.3801*** 
 (16.093) (16.118) (16.142) (16.136) 
     
age4/100000 -0.2495*** -0.2495*** -0.2495*** -0.2495*** 
 (-16.654) (-16.681) (-16.704) (-16.698) 
     
imm_age 0.5267** 1.4430*** -0.5919* -0.1863 
 (2.6866) (3.9948) (-2.2707) (-0.8094) 
     
imm_age2/100 -1.951* -5.754*** 2.235* 0.7651 
 (-2.5122) (-4.0144) (2.1417) (0.8370) 
     
imm_age3/1000 0.3134* 0.9982*** -0.3733* -0.1414 
 (2.3325) (4.0180) (-2.0438) (-0.8919) 
     
imm_age4/100000 -0.1872* -0.6404*** 0.2296 0.09587 
 (-2.1820) (-4.0325) (1.9475) (0.9451) 
     
educ 0.05023*** 0.05051*** 0.05026*** 0.05036*** 
 (262.18) (263.58) (263.02) (263.43) 
     
imm_educ -0.04357*** -0.01874*** -0.03950*** -0.03768*** 
 (-67.212) (-19.124) (-48.169) (-49.369) 
     
edmiss 0.1700*** 0.4055*** 0.1934*** 0.2829*** 
 (19.675) (31.022) (20.168) (27.570) 
     
imm -5.0668** -13.574*** 5.7146* 1.7190 
 (-2.7772) (-4.0493) (2.3825) (0.8061) 
     
Constant 6.2603*** 6.2574*** 6.2601*** 6.2589*** 
 (19.374) (19.397) (19.432) (19.421) 
N 825582 801012 811014 814585 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Annual Earnings) which is conditional on employment that Annual Earnings > 
50,000 Kroner (2005 currency). The interaction terms are age and education variables for immigrants. The 
calculation uses the data from 1980-2005. 
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4;
€ 
imm _ age = imm × age ,imm _ age2 = imm × age2,imm _ age3= imm × age3,imm _ age4 = imm × age4;
€ 
imm _ educ = imm × educ. 
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Table B-3: Log Earnings Regressions (Fixed Effects Model), Male Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.07852*** 0.05758*** 0.06365*** 0.08972*** 
 (19.196) (15.599) (4.6293) (28.340) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.5688*** -0.4025*** -0.3587** -0.5398*** 
 (-16.637) (-11.831) (-2.8844) (-20.094) 
     
ysm3/10000 1.174*** 0.7600*** 0.6373* 1.038*** 
 (14.222) (8.7175) (2.0147) (15.352) 
     
age 0.9974*** 0.9981*** 0.9942*** 0.9698*** 
 (45.818) (45.704) (45.506) (44.559) 
     
age2/10 -0.3479*** -0.3482*** -0.3464*** -0.3375*** 
 (-40.452) (-40.361) (-40.129) (-39.246) 
     
age3/1000 0.5423*** 0.5430*** 0.5394*** 0.5253*** 
 (36.609) (36.537) (36.273) (35.452) 
     
age4/100000 -0.3194*** -0.3199*** -0.3173*** -0.3090*** 
 (-33.977) (-33.921) (-33.626) (-32.863) 
     
Constant 2.0980*** 2.0895*** 2.1270*** 2.3471*** 
 (10.354) (10.281) (10.461) (11.589) 
N 958700 960021 949567 982341 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Annual Earnings) which is conditional on employment that Annual Earnings > 
50,000 Kroner (2005 currency). The calculation uses the data from 1980-2005. 
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4  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 Table B-4: Log Earnings Regressions (Fixed Effects Model), Female Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.08022*** 0.1088*** 0.1229*** 0.08001*** 
 (29.426) (20.267) (31.093) (17.977) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.5262*** -0.7344*** -0.9208*** -0.4809*** 
 (-22.233) (-14.400) (-24.419) (-12.638) 
     
ysm3/10000 0.9735*** 1.367*** 2.016*** 0.7737*** 
 (16.347) (9.9336) (19.564) (8.0137) 
     
age 0.3527*** 0.3548*** 0.3414*** 0.3470*** 
 (14.028) (13.940) (13.458) (13.690) 
     
age2/10 -0.1454*** -0.1466*** -0.1413*** -0.1432*** 
 (-14.650) (-14.591) (-14.114) (-14.309) 
     
age3/1000 0.2768*** 0.2795*** 0.2705*** 0.2730*** 
 (16.200) (16.157) (15.687) (15.849) 
     
age4/100000 -0.1941*** -0.1961*** -0.1904*** -0.1917*** 
 (-17.912) (-17.881) (-17.416) (-17.550) 
     
Constant 8.7727*** 8.7697*** 8.8879*** 8.8283*** 
 (37.466) (37.005) (37.631) (37.404) 
N 825582 801012 811014 814585 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Stand errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable is ln(Annual Earnings) is conditional on 
employment that Annual Earnings > 50,000 Kroner. 
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4  
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 Table B-5 Employment Rate Regressions, Male Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.05386*** 0.05555*** 0.09180*** 0.1013*** 
 (18.745) (24.301) (12.699) (59.798) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.4146*** -0.4056*** -0.7066*** -0.6491*** 
 (-17.057) (-18.731) (-9.7177) (-41.135) 
     
ysm3/10000 0.8601*** 0.7765*** 1.788*** 1.255*** 
 (14.615) (13.773) (8.8909) (29.927) 
     
age 0.2543*** 0.2543*** 0.2543*** 0.2542*** 
 (14.756) (14.657) (14.779) (14.318) 
     
age2/100 -0.9149*** -0.9150*** -0.9150*** -0.9149*** 
 (-13.435) (-13.345) (-13.456) (-13.036) 
     
age3/1000 0.1459*** 0.1459*** 0.1459*** 0.1459*** 
 (12.435) (12.351) (12.454) (12.066) 
     
age4/1000000 -0.8752*** -0.8752*** -0.8753*** -0.8753*** 
 (-11.756) (-11.676) (-11.774) (-11.408) 
     
imm_age 0.6114*** 0.7111*** -0.9048 -0.1353 
 (3.3433) (4.6945) (-1.9124) (-1.5014) 
     
imm_age2 -0.02371*** -0.02930*** 0.02995 0.004487 
 (-3.3123) (-4.8732) (1.5595) (1.2496) 
     
imm_age3/1000 0.4034*** 0.5304*** -0.3995 -0.06276 
 (3.2948) (5.0890) (-1.1741) (-1.0051) 
     
imm_age4/100000 -0.2547*** -0.3544*** 0.1701 0.02943 
 (-3.2979) (-5.3216) (0.7661) (0.7353) 
     
educ 0.01419*** 0.01406*** 0.01415*** 0.01451*** 
 (158.37) (156.30) (157.54) (158.04) 
     
imm_educ -0.01386*** -0.01598*** -0.007172*** -0.007803*** 
 (-25.817) (-41.672) (-5.6383) (-25.345) 
     
edmiss -0.05292*** -0.09654*** -0.06803*** 0.05490*** 
 (-10.396) (-21.017) (-11.956) (13.405) 
     
imm -5.8144*** -6.4224*** 8.9962* 1.0311 
 (-3.3784) (-4.5726) (2.0965) (1.2389) 
     
1980 Arrivals 0.05401*** -0.02654* 0.1362*** -0.01355** 
 (6.6812) (-2.3317) (4.3411) (-3.2616) 
     
1985 Arrivals -0.02062* -0.07649*** 0.002115 -0.1407*** 
 (-2.4850) (-7.8912) (0.07175) (-29.809) 
     
1990 Arrivals -0.1861*** -0.1595*** 0.1069*** -0.1744*** 
 (-17.799) (-15.496) (3.5448) (-35.190) 
     
1995 Arrivals -0.07107*** -0.2715*** 0.1561*** -0.05398*** 
 (-4.9682) (-22.026) (4.9489) (-5.1388) 
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 2000 Arrivals -0.03395* -0.3009*** 0.2336*** -0.02736* 
 (-2.3199) (-24.401) (6.6565) (-2.3357) 
     
Constant -1.8873*** -1.8857*** -1.8868*** -1.8915*** 
 (-11.777) (-11.687) (-11.792) (-11.454) 
N 1055866 1060240 1045609 1094500 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is employment rate which is conditional on that Annual Earnings > 50,000 Kroner 
(2005 currency). The calculation uses the data from 1980-2005.  The interaction terms are the age and education 
variables for immigrants.   
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4;
€ 
imm _ age = imm × age ,imm _ age2 = imm × age2,imm _ age3= imm × age3,imm _ age4 = imm × age4;
€ 
imm _ educ = imm × educ. 
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 Table B-6: Employment Rate Regressions, Female Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.08231*** 0.1009*** 0.1117*** 0.09455*** 
 (43.236) (29.831) (48.012) (40.736) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.4619*** -0.6808*** -0.7727*** -0.5021*** 
 (-25.819) (-19.380) (-31.483) (-22.025) 
     
ysm3/10000 0.7790*** 1.370*** 1.644*** 0.8165*** 
 (16.408) (13.646) (22.988) (12.934) 
     
age 0.03027 0.03030 0.03028 0.03023 
 (1.2242) (1.2315) (1.2254) (1.2226) 
     
age2/100 -0.2003* -0.2004* -0.2004* -0.2001* 
 (-2.0510) (-2.0624) (-2.0526) (-2.0493) 
     
age3/10000 0.5528** 0.5530*** 0.5529** 0.5526** 
 (3.2871) (3.3044) (3.2891) (3.2856) 
     
age4/1000000 -0.5074*** -0.5075*** -0.5074*** -0.5073*** 
 (-4.7575) (-4.7819) (-4.7601) (-4.7565) 
     
imm_age 0.6633*** 0.3321 -0.2174 0.1100 
 (5.5689) (1.6160) (-1.4481) (0.8635) 
     
imm_age2 -0.02597*** -0.01596 0.008061 -0.005087 
 (-5.4561) (-1.9396) (1.3324) (-0.9997) 
     
imm_age3/1000 0.4438*** 0.3247* -0.1281 0.09903 
 (5.3427) (2.2589) (-1.2029) (1.1162) 
     
imm_age4/100000 -0.2802*** -0.2376* 0.07284 -0.07127 
 (-5.2426) (-2.5669) (1.0541) (-1.2504) 
     
educ 0.02711*** 0.02704*** 0.02706*** 0.02723*** 
 (201.11) (200.99) (200.69) (201.91) 
     
imm_educ -0.02325*** -0.02031*** -0.02292*** -0.01613*** 
 (-54.347) (-33.712) (-44.651) (-36.778) 
     
edmiss 0.06590*** 0.02087** 0.03684*** 0.1334*** 
 (11.645) (2.6155) (5.8037) (22.132) 
     
imm -6.3183*** -2.7499 1.8235 -1.1625 
 (-5.7572) (-1.4554) (1.3285) (-0.9911) 
     
1980 Arrivals -0.08924*** 0.1258*** -0.01470 -0.01207 
 (-12.099) (7.0638) (-1.2195) (-1.6696) 
     
1985 Arrivals -0.09855*** 0.04882** -0.03189** -0.1716*** 
 (-13.898) (3.0077) (-2.6641) (-22.629) 
     
1990 Arrivals -0.1913*** 0.01255 -0.01987 -0.1617*** 
 (-25.866) (0.7737) (-1.6543) (-21.487) 
     
1995 Arrivals -0.1142*** -0.003529 0.07011*** -0.05970*** 
 (-14.245) (-0.1984) (5.6415) (-6.2157) 
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 2000 Arrivals -0.1065*** -0.01043 0.07986*** -0.03239** 
 (-11.293) (-0.5617) (5.8623) (-2.6638) 
     
Constant 0.2354 0.2362 0.2360 0.2340 
 (1.0231) (1.0319) (1.0262) (1.0173) 
N 1054343 1016527 1036344 1044918 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is employment rate which is conditional on that Annual Earnings > 50,000 Kroner 
(2005 currency). The calculation uses the data from 1980-2005.  The interaction terms are the age and education 
variables for immigrants.   
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4;
€ 
imm _ age = imm × age ,imm _ age2 = imm × age2,imm _ age3= imm × age3,imm _ age4 = imm × age4;
€ 
imm _ educ = imm × educ. 
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 Table B-7: Log Earnings Regressions (Cross-sectional Model), Female Married Immigrant Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.07367*** 0.09561*** 0.1443*** 0.09130*** 
 (12.264) (12.579) (9.4644) (15.406) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.5181*** -0.5944*** -1.080*** -0.5282*** 
 (-9.7438) (-8.1835) (-6.8447) (-10.071) 
     
ysm3/1000 0.1378*** 0.1224*** 0.2579*** 0.1013*** 
 (10.264) (6.2781) (5.5757) (7.4217) 
     
age 0.1033** 0.1033** 0.1033** 0.1033** 
 (2.6130) (2.6098) (2.6121) (2.6115) 
     
age2/100 -0.4983** -0.4983** -0.4983** -0.4983** 
 (-3.2082) (-3.2041) (-3.2069) (-3.2063) 
     
age3/1000 0.1132*** 0.1132*** 0.1132*** 0.1132*** 
 (4.2505) (4.2451) (4.2488) (4.2481) 
     
age4/1000000 -0.9114*** -0.9114*** -0.9114*** -0.9114*** 
 (-5.4182) (-5.4114) (-5.4162) (-5.4152) 
     
imm_age 0.9073** 0.7550 0.6622 0.03934 
 (2.6238) (1.7960) (0.7972) (0.1546) 
     
imm_age2/100 -3.289* -3.212 -2.665 -0.004975 
 (-2.4058) (-1.9330) (-0.7966) (-0.004924) 
     
imm_age3/1000 0.5277* 0.5852* 0.4624 -0.03086 
 (2.2352) (2.0396) (0.7855) (-0.1761) 
     
imm_age4/100000 -0.3214* -0.3913* -0.2959 0.03969 
 (-2.1361) (-2.1411) (-0.7743) (0.3543) 
     
educ 0.05509*** 0.05513*** 0.05514*** 0.05511*** 
 (254.74) (254.60) (254.76) (254.70) 
     
imm_educ -0.05513*** -0.02720*** -0.04146*** -0.04515*** 
 (-53.423) (-21.279) (-15.166) (-50.426) 
     
edmiss 0.1189*** 0.3196*** 0.3327*** 0.2205*** 
 (8.2633) (17.348) (11.006) (17.298) 
     
imm -8.7079** -6.5266 -6.0891 -0.5070 
 (-2.7013) (-1.6660) (-0.8015) (-0.2148) 
     
Constant 10.587*** 10.587*** 10.587*** 10.587*** 
 (28.629) (28.590) (28.615) (28.612) 
N 645802 642420 637391 654365 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Annual Earnings) which is conditional on employment that Annual Earnings > 
50,000 Kroner (2005 currency). The interaction terms are age and education variables for immigrants. The 
calculation uses the data from 1980-2005. 
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4;
€ 
imm _ age = imm × age ,imm _ age2 = imm × age2,imm _ age3= imm × age3,imm _ age4 = imm × age4;
€ 
imm _ educ = imm × educ. 
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 Table B-8: Log Earnings Regressions (Cross-sectional Model), Female Married Native Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.07821*** 0.1433*** 0.1239*** 0.1144*** 
 (17.026) (7.8276) (25.226) (6.7178) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.4125*** -0.6884*** -0.8631*** -0.6524*** 
 (-9.9128) (-3.5572) (-17.764) (-4.4635) 
     
ysm3/10000 0.8549*** 1.156* 1.949*** 1.146** 
 (7.9020) (1.9687) (14.448) (3.1962) 
     
age 0.1033** 0.1033** 0.1033** 0.1033** 
 (2.6096) (2.6112) (2.6118) (2.6122) 
     
age2/1000 -4.983** -4.983** -4.983** -4.983** 
 (-3.2041) (-3.2054) (-3.2068) (-3.2065) 
     
age3/10000 1.132*** 1.132*** 1.132*** 1.132*** 
 (4.2451) (4.2468) (4.2487) (4.2483) 
     
age4/1000000 -0.9114*** -0.9115*** -0.9114*** -0.9115*** 
 (-5.4114) (-5.4139) (-5.4159) (-5.4158) 
     
imm_age 0.6396* 3.1757*** -0.3127 0.05702 
 (2.5375) (3.4231) (-1.1222) (0.05880) 
     
imm_age2/100 -2.480* -12.00** 1.276 -0.3095 
 (-2.4820) (-3.2249) (1.1443) (-0.08023) 
     
imm_age3/1000 0.4099* 1.978** -0.2321 0.06724 
 (2.3671) (3.0303) (-1.1908) (0.1004) 
     
imm_age4/1000000 -2.472* -12.07** 1.543 -0.5281 
 (-2.2325) (-2.8579) (1.2270) (-0.1232) 
     
educ 0.05510*** 0.05521*** 0.05509*** 0.05522*** 
 (254.48) (254.94) (254.63) (255.00) 
     
imm_educ -0.04514*** -0.02028*** -0.04838*** -0.01963*** 
 (-47.549) (-8.8635) (-52.540) (-5.8966) 
     
edmiss 0.1693*** 0.6601*** 0.1079*** 0.6959*** 
 (13.051) (18.585) (9.4162) (16.970) 
     
imm -5.8407* -31.276*** 2.9465 -0.7012 
 (-2.4925) (-3.6666) (1.1483) (-0.07818) 
     
Constant 10.587*** 10.585*** 10.588*** 10.585*** 
 (28.593) (28.599) (28.617) (28.608) 
N 656045 637074 652197 636608 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Annual Earnings) which is conditional on employment that Annual Earnings > 
50,000 Kroner (2005 currency). The interaction terms are between the age and education variables. The 
calculation uses the data from 1980-2005. 
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4;
€ 
imm _ age = imm × age ,imm _ age2 = imm × age2,imm _ age3= imm × age3,imm _ age4 = imm × age4;
€ 
imm _ educ = imm × educ. 
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 Table B-9: Log Earnings Regressions (Fixed Effects Model), Female Married Immigrant Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.09241*** 0.09823*** 0.1359*** 0.08988*** 
 (20.470) (16.183) (10.340) (18.130) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.7155*** -0.7154*** -1.071*** -0.5748*** 
 (-18.307) (-12.392) (-8.2018) (-13.453) 
     
ysm3/10000 1.443*** 1.406*** 2.413*** 0.9980*** 
 (14.826) (9.0396) (6.4641) (9.1473) 
     
age -0.08781** -0.09026** -0.09117** -0.08571** 
 (-3.0552) (-3.1250) (-3.1514) (-2.9803) 
     
age2/100 0.1862 0.1909 0.1959 0.1794 
 (1.6480) (1.6820) (1.7227) (1.5869) 
     
age3/10000 0.1158 0.1150 0.1043 0.1245 
 (0.5980) (0.5910) (0.5349) (0.6425) 
     
age4/1000000 -0.3611** -0.3646** -0.3565** -0.3646** 
 (-2.9512) (-2.9656) (-2.8946) (-2.9775) 
     
Constant 13.068*** 13.098*** 13.108*** 13.034*** 
 (48.602) (48.475) (48.432) (48.449) 
N 645802 642420 637391 654365 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Annual Earnings) which is conditional on employment that Annual Earnings > 
50,000 Kroner (2005 currency). The calculation uses the data from 1980-2005. 
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4  
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Table B-10: Log Earnings Regressions (Fixed Effects Model), Female Married Native Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.07870*** 0.1915*** 0.1252*** 0.06684*** 
 (21.156) (13.205) (29.703) (4.2332) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.4627*** -1.170*** -0.9556*** -0.3561** 
 (-14.181) (-8.0472) (-23.854) (-2.8231) 
     
ysm3/10000 0.8092*** 2.137*** 2.106*** 0.4974 
 (9.6643) (5.0635) (19.345) (1.6657) 
     
age -0.07462** -0.08531** -0.09862*** -0.09178** 
 (-2.6017) (-2.9466) (-3.4259) (-3.1708) 
     
age2/100 0.1332 0.1742 0.2257* 0.1986 
 (1.1817) (1.5307) (1.9946) (1.7455) 
     
age3/100000 2.072 1.393 0.5230 0.9921 
 (1.0717) (0.7139) (0.2695) (0.5086) 
     
age4/1000000 -0.4184*** -0.3773** -0.3231** -0.3530** 
 (-3.4261) (-3.0610) (-2.6360) (-2.8652) 
     
Constant 12.935*** 13.050*** 13.163*** 13.114*** 
 (48.210) (48.180) (48.885) (48.429) 
N 656045 637074 652197 636608 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Annual Earnings) which is conditional on employment that Annual Earnings > 50,000 
Kroner (2005 currency). The calculation uses the data from 1980-2005. 
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4  
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 Table B-11: Employment Rate Regressions, Female Married Immigrant Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.06733*** 0.1030*** 0.1068*** 0.09911*** 
 (16.639) (25.302) (13.799) (37.863) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.4629*** -0.7017*** -0.6940*** -0.5192*** 
 (-12.792) (-16.898) (-8.2023) (-19.988) 
     
ysm3/10000 0.9326*** 1.436*** 1.407*** 0.8258*** 
 (10.114) (12.290) (5.4551) (11.392) 
     
age -0.1557*** -0.1557*** -0.1557*** -0.1557*** 
 (-5.5462) (-5.5303) (-5.5407) (-5.5008) 
     
age2/100 0.5153*** 0.5153*** 0.5153*** 0.5153*** 
 (4.6694) (4.6559) (4.6645) (4.6316) 
     
age3/10000 -0.6386*** -0.6386*** -0.6385*** -0.6387*** 
 (-3.3747) (-3.3648) (-3.3709) (-3.3477) 
     
age4/1000000 0.2201 0.2200 0.2200 0.2201 
 (1.8411) (1.8354) (1.8386) (1.8268) 
     
imm_age 0.8559*** 0.07210 0.3144 0.3606* 
 (3.5984) (0.2867) (0.6493) (2.5438) 
     
imm_age2 -0.03375*** -0.007203 -0.01235 -0.01458* 
 (-3.5810) (-0.7207) (-0.6296) (-2.5746) 
     
imm_age3/1000 0.5784*** 0.1951 0.2077 0.2546** 
 (3.5457) (1.1249) (0.5984) (2.5784) 
     
imm_age4/100000 -0.3661*** -0.1664 -0.1274 -0.1649** 
 (-3.5168) (-1.4989) (-0.5626) (-2.5994) 
     
educ 0.02559*** 0.02558*** 0.02557*** 0.02563*** 
 (164.84) (164.32) (164.47) (163.79) 
     
imm_educ -0.02774*** -0.02026*** -0.02531*** -0.01469*** 
 (-36.769) (-25.261) (-15.235) (-28.578) 
     
Edmiss 0.05463*** 0.03340** -0.003167 0.1826*** 
 (5.0866) (2.7281) (-0.1613) (23.669) 
     
imm -7.7011*** 0.08210 -3.2418 -3.5993** 
 (-3.4830) (0.03524) (-0.7363) (-2.7563) 
     
1980 Arrivals -0.1016*** 0.1359*** 0.1412** -0.02122** 
 (-7.9809) (6.4585) (2.9016) (-2.5988) 
     
1985 Arrivals -0.1557*** 0.05506** 0.1030* -0.1806*** 
 (-12.678) (2.8107) (2.1214) (-21.035) 
     
1990 Arrivals -0.2490*** 0.03777* 0.05309 -0.1571*** 
 (-17.935) (1.9609) (1.0901) (-18.393) 
     
1995 Arrivals -0.2254*** 0.03605 0.1513** -0.06784*** 
 (-13.631) (1.6985) (3.0415) (-6.3657) 
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 2000 Arrivals -0.2348*** 0.04194 0.1467** -0.07722*** 
 (-11.382) (1.7430) (2.7696) (-5.5242) 
     
Constant 2.0146*** 2.0147*** 2.0149*** 2.0137*** 
 (7.6719) (7.6504) (7.6655) (7.6066) 
N 809128 807677 799440 832632 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Stand errors are reported in parentheses. Dependent variable is employment rate which is conditional on 
that Annual Earnings > 50,000 Kroner. Additional control variables are interaction terms between the age and 
education variables.  
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4;
€ 
imm _ age = imm × age ,imm _ age2 = imm × age2,imm _ age3= imm × age3,imm _ age4 = imm × age4;
€ 
imm _ educ = imm × educ. 
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 Table B-12: Employment Rate Regressions, Female Married Native Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.09113*** 0.1204*** 0.1157*** 0.08508*** 
 (38.679) (13.828) (46.704) (9.2934) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.4555*** -0.7847*** -0.8062*** -0.5614*** 
 (-20.204) (-8.1512) (-30.992) (-6.9758) 
     
ysm3/10000 0.6929*** 1.513*** 1.715*** 0.9282*** 
 (11.372) (5.0453) (22.771) (4.5954) 
     
age -0.1557*** -0.1557*** -0.1557*** -0.1557*** 
 (-5.5034) (-5.5421) (-5.4999) (-5.5428) 
     
age2/100 0.5153*** 0.5153*** 0.5153*** 0.5153*** 
 (4.6335) (4.6659) (4.6303) (4.6666) 
     
age3/10000 -0.6386*** -0.6386*** -0.6386*** -0.6386*** 
 (-3.3489) (-3.3720) (-3.3464) (-3.3727) 
     
age4/1000000 0.2201 0.2200 0.2200 0.2201 
 (1.8272) (1.8394) (1.8255) (1.8399) 
     
imm_age 0.8359*** 0.6715 -0.004686 0.8505 
 (5.5827) (1.2679) (-0.02913) (1.4488) 
     
imm_age2/100 -3.337*** -2.745 -0.05008 -3.505 
 (-5.5679) (-1.2804) (-0.07734) (-1.4888) 
     
imm_age3/10000 5.763*** 4.802 0.2131 6.119 
 (5.5007) (1.2662) (0.1872) (1.4848) 
     
imm_age4/1000000 -3.651*** -3.066 -0.2284 -3.808 
 (-5.4062) (-1.2387) (-0.3094) (-1.4320) 
     
educ 0.02561*** 0.02558*** 0.02558*** 0.02559*** 
 (163.71) (164.59) (163.48) (164.64) 
     
imm_educ -0.01880*** -0.01837*** -0.02116*** -0.01550*** 
 (-31.628) (-12.810) (-36.547) (-7.3299) 
     
edmiss 0.1147*** 0.04356* 0.04655*** 0.08263*** 
 (13.716) (2.0598) (5.8020) (3.3284) 
     
imm -7.9638*** -6.3442 -0.1273 -7.6543 
 (-5.7790) (-1.3155) (-0.08646) (-1.4210) 
     
1980 Arrivals -0.05436*** 0.1456** -0.03096* 0.08393** 
 (-5.1420) (2.9699) (-2.4232) (2.7868) 
     
1985 Arrivals -0.01848 0.1094* -0.04911*** -0.1117** 
 (-1.7972) (2.5624) (-3.8715) (-3.0950) 
     
1990 Arrivals -0.04899*** 0.1132** -0.02464 -0.03385 
 (-4.6646) (2.5937) (-1.9391) (-0.8351) 
     
1995 Arrivals 0.03421** 0.08455 0.06253*** -0.1373*** 
 (3.0956) (1.8356) (4.7574) (-3.7637) 
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 2000 Arrivals 0.02667* 0.08965 0.07219*** -0.02364 
 (2.0644) (1.8816) (4.9105) (-0.5095) 
     
Constant 2.0142*** 2.0146*** 2.0146*** 2.0143*** 
 (7.6115) (7.6666) (7.6081) (7.6668) 
N 831264 798866 827770 797956 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is employment rate which is conditional on that Annual Earnings > 50,000 Kroner 
(2005 currency). The calculation uses the data from 1980-2005.  The interaction terms are the age and education 
variables for immigrants.   
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4;
€ 
imm _ age = imm × age ,imm _ age2 = imm × age2,imm _ age3= imm × age3,imm _ age4 = imm × age4;
€ 
imm _ educ = imm × educ. 
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 Table B-13: Log Earnings Regressions with Children Effects (Fixed Effects Model), Female 
Married Immigrant Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.09431*** 0.1046*** 0.1495*** 0.08860*** 
 (21.138) (17.524) (11.449) (18.396) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.7022*** -0.7117*** -1.201*** -0.5609*** 
 (-18.096) (-12.515) (-9.2770) (-13.451) 
     
ysm3/1000 0.1424*** 0.1371*** 0.2758*** 0.09918*** 
 (14.776) (8.9889) (7.4990) (9.3186) 
     
age 0.5649*** 0.5650*** 0.5674*** 0.5640*** 
 (19.678) (19.571) (19.632) (19.622) 
     
age2/10 -0.1904*** -0.1908*** -0.1914*** -0.1902*** 
 (-16.875) (-16.816) (-16.852) (-16.835) 
     
age3/1000 0.2931*** 0.2943*** 0.2949*** 0.2929*** 
 (15.160) (15.138) (15.150) (15.130) 
     
age4/100000 -0.1717*** -0.1727*** -0.1728*** -0.1716*** 
 (-14.073) (-14.081) (-14.069) (-14.047) 
     
d_nc0 -0.04244*** -0.04232*** -0.04243*** -0.04237*** 
 (-19.619) (-19.515) (-19.596) (-19.486) 
     
d_nc1 -0.2724*** -0.2722*** -0.2723*** -0.2722*** 
 (-123.30) (-122.92) (-123.18) (-122.62) 
     
d_nc2 -0.1891*** -0.1889*** -0.1891*** -0.1890*** 
 (-88.548) (-88.230) (-88.444) (-88.028) 
     
d_nc3_6 -0.1765*** -0.1762*** -0.1764*** -0.1762*** 
 (-126.95) (-126.38) (-126.70) (-126.18) 
     
d_nc7_12 -0.1575*** -0.1571*** -0.1574*** -0.1572*** 
 (-125.48) (-124.76) (-125.07) (-124.67) 
     
d_nc13_18 -0.01753*** -0.01725*** -0.01733*** -0.01714*** 
 (-13.855) (-13.586) (-13.660) (-13.489) 
     
md_nc0 -0.02201 0.1549*** 0.01015 0.04451*** 
 (-1.4753) (7.9443) (0.2637) (3.8347) 
     
md_nc1 0.1203*** 0.2128*** 0.02718 0.08731*** 
 (8.0254) (10.406) (0.6695) (7.4152) 
     
md_nc2 0.08336*** 0.09254*** -0.05685 0.07056*** 
 (5.7386) (4.5451) (-1.3253) (6.4056) 
     
md_nc3_6 0.1029*** 0.04995*** 0.005152 0.09948*** 
 (10.698) (3.6955) (0.1799) (13.486) 
     
md_nc7_12 0.1178*** 0.08385*** 0.07457** 0.09638*** 
 (13.093) (6.9010) (2.7622) (14.199) 
     
md_nc13_18 0.03454*** 0.02530* 0.09369*** 0.008823 
 (3.3062) (2.0510) (3.3372) (1.1814) 
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Constant 5.9927*** 5.9965*** 5.9722*** 5.9949*** 
 (22.325) (22.216) (22.101) (22.308) 
N 645802 642420 637391 654365 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Annual Earnings) which is conditional on employment that Annual Earnings > 
50,000 Kroner (2005 currency). The calculation uses the data from 1980-2005. The interaction terms are the 
child age dummy variables for immigrants. d_nc* is the dummy variable of individual children’s age group, e.g. 
0, 1, 3-6, 7-12, 13-18 years old. imm denotes immigrant.  
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4;
€ 
imm _ age = imm × age ,imm _ age2 = imm × age2,imm _ age3= imm × age3,imm _ age4 = imm × age4;
€ 
imm _ educ = imm × educ;
€ 
md _ nc* = d _ nc *×imm . 
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 Table B-14: Log Earnings Regressions with Children Effects (Fixed Effects Model), Female 
Married Native Samples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Philippines China Thailand Vietnam 
ysm 0.09445*** 0.1786*** 0.1345*** 0.07651*** 
 (24.719) (12.358) (32.524) (4.8550) 
     
ysm2/100 -0.5494*** -0.9913*** -1.014*** -0.4382*** 
 (-16.271) (-6.6530) (-25.743) (-3.4375) 
     
ysm3/10000 0.9679*** 1.691*** 2.240*** 0.7408* 
 (11.272) (3.8470) (20.964) (2.4571) 
     
age 0.5724*** 0.5730*** 0.5519*** 0.5678*** 
 (19.984) (19.811) (19.197) (19.638) 
     
age2/10 -0.1938*** -0.1935*** -0.1859*** -0.1915*** 
 (-17.216) (-17.020) (-16.446) (-16.853) 
     
age3/1000 0.2996*** 0.2982*** 0.2861*** 0.2949*** 
 (15.529) (15.307) (14.773) (15.146) 
     
age4/100000 -0.1760*** -0.1747*** -0.1676*** -0.1727*** 
 (-14.460) (-14.216) (-13.719) (-14.060) 
     
d_nc0 -0.04230*** -0.04250*** -0.04220*** -0.04246*** 
 (-19.502) (-19.617) (-19.449) (-19.606) 
     
d_nc1 -0.2721*** -0.2724*** -0.2720*** -0.2724*** 
 (-122.87) (-123.14) (-122.78) (-123.17) 
     
d_nc2 -0.1888*** -0.1892*** -0.1887*** -0.1891*** 
 (-88.182) (-88.434) (-88.096) (-88.450) 
     
d_nc3_6 -0.1760*** -0.1765*** -0.1759*** -0.1764*** 
 (-126.33) (-126.71) (-126.18) (-126.72) 
     
d_nc7_12 -0.1568*** -0.1575*** -0.1568*** -0.1574*** 
 (-124.71) (-125.08) (-124.58) (-125.10) 
     
d_nc13_18 -0.01682*** -0.01737*** -0.01702*** -0.01737*** 
 (-13.268) (-13.681) (-13.407) (-13.690) 
     
md_nc0 0.04835*** 0.1140** 0.02889* -0.03162 
 (4.1759) (3.1115) (2.0407) (-0.6933) 
     
md_nc1 0.04861*** 0.2350*** -0.02528 -0.08908 
 (4.1182) (6.2515) (-1.6715) (-1.8999) 
     
md_nc2 0.03272** 0.2015*** -0.04002** 0.01599 
 (2.8501) (5.0690) (-2.6380) (0.3292) 
     
md_nc3_6 0.05157*** 0.1298*** 0.00006030 0.1165*** 
 (6.4747) (4.3071) (0.005840) (3.4958) 
     
md_nc7_12 0.04825*** 0.1085** 0.08984*** 0.2020*** 
 (6.1798) (2.9103) (9.4828) (6.3498) 
     
md_nc13_18 0.02128* 0.02594 0.04847*** -0.004115 
 (2.3791) (0.5491) (4.9655) (-0.1158) 
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Constant 5.9203*** 5.9154*** 6.1136*** 5.9670*** 
 (22.106) (21.872) (22.745) (22.070) 
N 656045 637074 652197 636608 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Annual Earnings) which is conditional on employment that Annual Earnings > 
50,000 Kroner (2005 currency). The calculation uses the data from 1980-2005. The interaction terms are the 
child age dummy variables for immigrants. d_nc* is the dummy variable of individual children’s age group, e.g. 
0, 1, 3-6, 7-12, 13-18 years old. imm denotes immigrant.  
€ 
ysm2 = ysm2, ysm3= ysm3,age2 = age2,age3= age3,age4 = age4;
€ 
imm _ age = imm × age ,imm _ age2 = imm × age2,imm _ age3= imm × age3,imm _ age4 = imm × age4;
€ 
imm _ educ = imm × educ;
€ 
md _ nc* = d _ nc *×imm . 
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